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INTRODUCTION
This essay tells the story of the rise, development and future direc-
tions of critical race theory and related scholarship. 1 In telling the story,
I suggest that critical race theory (CRT) rises, in part, as a challenge to
the emergence of colorblind ideology in law, a major theme of the schol-
arship. 2  I contend that conflict, as a process of intellectual and institu-
tional growth, marks the development of critical race theory and provides
concrete and experiential examples of some of its key insights and
themes. These conflicts are waged in various institutional settings over
the structural and discursive meanings of race and the role that race plays
in society, an argument made in part, by Kimberl6 Crenshaw,3 and a
story drawn in parts from her, Stephanie Phillips, 4 and Cheryl Harris.5
1. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995) [here-
inafter CRT: KEY WRITINGS]; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter CRT: CUJTING EDGE]; RACE AND RACES: CASES AND
RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, & Stephanie
Wildman eds., 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (Dorothy A.
Brown ed., 2003) [hereinafter CRT: CASES]; RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001) [hereinafter DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN
INTRODUCTION]; CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco
Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp, & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002); THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A
CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE LATINO/A
CONDITION]; FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002);
Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467
(1996); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory,
Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1993), reprinted in CRT: CUTTING
EDGE, supra, at 354-68 and reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS
READER 211-15 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995) [hereinafter POWER, PRIVILEGE AND
LAW]; Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215 (2002);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness, " and Racial Hierarchy in
American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997); Symposium, Critical Race Theory, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741
(1994); Symposium, Critical Race Lawyering: Reopening the Emmett Till Case: Lessons and Chal-
lenges for Critical Race Practice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2101 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Colorblind, " 44 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1991), reprinted in CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 257-75; see also DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, 115-35 (5th ed. 2004); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN
INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 21-22; Harris, supra note 1, at 1229-30; Tanya Kateri Hernandez,
"Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L.
REV. 97 (1998); discussion infra notes 25-36, 78-88, 168-203 and accompanying text.
3. CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xiii-xxxii; Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, The First
Decade: Critical Reflections, or "A Foot in the Closing Door," 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2002),
reprinted in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 9-31.
4. See generally Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Work-
shop with LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247 (1999).
5. See generally Harris, supra note 1. In telling the story of CRT's development, Crenshaw
specifically notes at the outset that CRT did not develop in the "abstract but in the context shaped by
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Conflict within CRT in turn, to some extent spurs the development of
CRT-related scholarship, such as Asian American Legal Scholarship,
Critical Race Feminism and specifically Latino and Latina Critical
Schools (LatCrit).6 Though this related scholarship could be seen as
fragmenting the CRT movement, 7 I suggest, focusing primarily on Lat-
Crit, that it has actually deepened it. However, a significant area that
CRT has not adequately addressed is the issue of class and its relation-
ship to race and other subordinating structures. I examine reasons why
this is the case even though CRT scholars have repeatedly called for
analyses of the relationship between race and class and propose critical
class analyses or classcrits as a necessary future direction of CRT and
related scholarship.8
A few caveats are in order. This story could be told in as many dif-
ferent ways as there are CRT theorists. 9 Further, although this rendition
presents CRT as a "fully unified school of thought," this is not the case,
as CRT remains a work in progress. 10 In addition, while I present what
specific institutional struggles over concrete issues that were set in motion by certain individuals."
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 9.
6. See infra notes, 46-52, 104-16 and accompanying text.
7. See Otis T. Bryant, Factualism Within the Critical Race Theory Movement: Fact or Fic-
tion? A Comparative Analysis of the Emerging LatCrit and AsianCrit Self-Identification Theories
and a Continued Critique (and Defense) of the Black/White Binary (discussing the fragmentation of
the movement and suggesting that the differences are small) (manuscript on file with author).
8. Martha McCluskey and i, with support of the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy at
University at Buffalo recently planned a workshop scheduled for January 2007 to explore the possi-
bility of launching a new network of scholars interested in developing a progressive legal economic
theory and politics. We explained that the term "ClassCrits'" (taken from an earlier draft of this
paper) reflected "our interest in focusing on economics through the lens of critical legal scholarship
movements, such as critical legal studies, critical feminist theory, critical race theory, LatCrit, and
queer theory. That is, we start[ed] with the assumption that economics in law is inextricably politi-
cal and fundamentally tied to questions of systemic status-based subordination." We explained our
interest and posed a number of questions in an invitation roughly as follows:
Economic inequality has become a growing problem locally, nationally and internation-
ally. In light of this central social and political reality, it is time to foreground economics in pro-
gressive jurisprudence and to reconsider longstanding assumptions and approaches in legal scholar-
ship and practice. We aim to provide an alternative to the predominant discussions of "law and
economics" grounded in neoclassical economic theory and its denial of "class." Many legal scholars
are now interested in challenging or broadening some of the assumptions of neoclassical economics.
Nonetheless, the question of class and the role of institutionalized inequality still lurks beneath the
surface of most discussions of economics in legal academia.
Here are a few of the questions we want to explore through a critical analysis of economic
inequality. How might a critical class analysis of law and economic inequality build on, differ from
or respond to other approaches to analyzing law and economic inequality, such as Law and Econom-
ics, poverty law, labor law, socioeconomic and legal realism? How might a focus on class contrib-
ute to the debates within critical theory and practice, such as how to address legal and societal sub-
ordination? What insights from earlier work in critical legal studies and legal realism might be
revived, updated, and improved to better address contemporary concerns and debates? What is the
relationship between subordinated identity based on economic class and institutionalized structures
of economic subordination? How might the perspectives and insights of critical feminism and
critical race theory help develop previous work on economic class in law? How might ClassCrits
build upon the idea of anti- subordination praxis and intersectionality? What can we do to build a
ClassCrits network?
9. See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 9; see also Harris, supra note 1, at 1218 (making a similar
point).
10. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 20.
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are commonly agreed to be the "tenets" of CRT, " not every precept pre-
sented here is held valid by every self-described critical race scholar.
Perhaps that is as it should be. And finally, although I provide an over-
view of Asian American Legal Scholarship, Critical Race Feminism, and
LatCrit as CRT-related scholarship, I primarily focus on the thematic and
institutional development of "LatCrit" because it in part grows out of
internal conflict within CRT and because of its deep institutionalization,
especially given the cessation of the CRT workshop. 12
Parts One through Four of this article present a narrative of the ori-
gins and development of Critical Race Theory. Part One provides an
overview of CRT and related scholarship and some of its basic themes.
Part Two discusses CRT's intellectual antecedents. Part Three discusses
a series of four sets of conflicts that I suggest have contributed to its in-
tellectual content and institutional development. These involve conflicts
between future critical race scholars with the Harvard Law School ad-
ministration in the early eighties, later conflicts with critical legal studies,
and a debate at the University of California Los Angeles Law School
(UCLA) around the issue of affirmative action in the context of the Cali-
fornia Proposition 209. They also involve conflicts internal to CRT, one
challenging CRT views on sexual oppression and another involving the
experiences and perspectives of non-black people of color, the latter in
part leading to the establishment of LatCrit. Part Four then lays out
CRT's basic tenets and methodological fingerprints.
Part Five builds upon the context developed in the first four sections
of the paper and applies critical theory insights and methods to an his-
torical analysis of law and race. In doing so, I seek to provide a counter-
narrative, as Derrick Bell suggests, 13 to the dominant story about race
and law. The dominant story suggests that the struggle for racial justice,
though long and incremental, is nevertheless forward-moving, progres-
sive, and eventually triumphant, given the American creed and pre-
cepts. 14  The counter-narrative challenges this, suggesting that racial
justice has not triumphed and that the white supremacy of American law
first based explicitly on a theory of white superiority and black inferior-
ity continues now under the guise, through the operation, and on a theory
of colorblindness. Part Five, thus, seeks to do Critical Race Theory. Part
Six, summarizes a number of the key insights of related CRT scholarship
with a particular focus on LatCrit. While it has been suggested that the
development of this related scholarship has fragmented the CRT pro-
11. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
13. BELL, supra note 2, at 21-22; see also DELGADO & STEANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION,
supra note 1, at 40-41.
14. BELL, supra note 2, at 21-22.
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ject,15 I suggest that these movements and insights necessarily inform the
CRT project.
Part Seven briefly takes up an important refrain and critique of
CRT: that it more systematically explore the relationship between class
and race. 16 This I think requires serious engagement with the notion and
structures of class. Drawing on similar work and critiques by Richard
Delgado,17 I explore possible reasons why CRT, which has made signifi-
cant contributions to feminist legal scholarship,18 and gay, lesbian, and
queer legal scholarship,19 in addition to race scholarship, has not ade-
quately engaged the issues of class. I suggest class analyses or the
founding of classcrits as a future direction of CRT scholarship and advo-
cacy.
I. OVERVIEW
One of the most significant developments in law on issues of race
and ethnicity in the last twenty years is the development of Critical Race
Theory (CRT) and related scholarship.20 The name, "Critical Race The-
ory" was coined in the late 1980's by Kimberld Crenshaw who explained
that the theory represented a racial analysis, intervention and critique of
traditional civil rights theory on the one hand, and of Critical Legal Stud-
ies insights on the other.21 Its basic premises are that race and racism
are endemic to the American normative order and a pillar of American
institutional and community life. Further, it suggests that law does not
merely reflect and mediate pre-existing racialized social conflicts and
relations. 22  Instead law, as part of the social fabric and the larger hege-
monic order, constitutes, constructs and produces races and race relations
15. See infra note 117.
16. See infra note 247.
17. See generally Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of
Recent Writings About Race, Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 121 (2003) [hereinafter Delgado, Blind Alleys]; Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About
Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO.
L.J. 2279 (2001) [hereinafter Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race]; Delgado, The Current
Landscape of Race: Old Targets, New Opportunities, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2006) [hereinafter
Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race]; infra notes 247-98.
18. 1 am thinking, for instance, of intersectional theory as a significant contribution to femi-
nist legal theory. See Kimberl Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991), reprinted in part in CRT:
KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 357-83 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins]; KIMBERLt
CRENSHAW, A BLACK FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND POLITICS, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 356-80 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
THE POLITICS OF LAW], see also infra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
19. Here I am thinking about multidimensionality theory as a contribution to gay, lesbian, and
queer theory. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronor-
mativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999); Francisco Val-
des, Afterword: Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimen-
sionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (1998); see
also infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
20. See generally, supra note 1.
21. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 9-31; CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xiii-xxxii.
22. Harris, supra note 1, at 1216-17.
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23in a way that suppoAs white supremacy. Critical Race Theory, as
Cheryl Harris explains, "coheres in the drive to excavate the relationship
between the law, legal doctrine, ideology, and [white] racial power and
the motivation 'not merely to understand the vexed bond between law
and racial power but to change it.'
24
Critical Race Theory arose during the ascendance of, and as a chal-
lenge to the ideology of colorblindness in law,25 which asserts that race,
like eye color, is and should be irrelevant to the determination of indi-
viduals' opportunities. A noble sentiment perhaps, but Critical Race
Theory, while maintaining that race is not like eye color,26 argues that
legal colorblindness operates as if a colorblind society already exists and
has always existed in the United States.27 In doing so, it ignores and
cements the racial caste system constructed in part by law.28 In other
23. Id. For recent discussions of the construction of racial identity at the personal level, see,
e.g., Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261 (2006); Angela Onyuachi-Willig,
Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REv. 873 (2006).
24. Harris, supra note 1, at 1218 (quoting CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xiii).
25. See CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xvi-xvii (noting that at the emergence of CRT,
many of its principle figures experienced the "boundaries of 'acceptable' racial discourse as becom-
ing suddenly narrowed" and explaining that while there were differences between liberal and con-
servative positions they "defined and constructed 'racism' the same way, [in contrast to future CRT
scholars] as the opposite of color-blindness"); see also Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that
CRT came into "existence at the twilight of what had been a transformative social period" referenc-
ing the civil rights movement of the sixties and seventies). In retrospect, it becomes clear that
CRT's initial conflicts are related to the colorblind perspectives of their adversaries. See infra notes
78-92. Further, CRT emerges at the same time that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause in the racial context increasingly shift toward and are based on notions of color-
blind individualism. See infra notes 30-36, 171-206 and accompanying text. For discussions of
colorblindness, see BELL, supra note 2, at 115-35; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN
INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 21-22; Gotanda, supra note 2, at 257-75. See generally MICHAEL
K. BROWN ET. AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 193 (2003)
[hereinafter BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE] (reviewed, from a CRT perspective by Delgado,
The Current Landscape of Race, supra note 17); Cheryl Harris, Review Essay: Whitewashing Race:
Scapegoating Culture, 94 CAL. L. REv. 907 (2006); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and
Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1 (1995); Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minyer, & Karen Winter, Contex-
tual Strict Scrutiny, 49 HoW. L.J. 241 (2006).
26. Harris, supra note 1, at 1229. Critical race theorists would argue that race is socially
constructed in a process, in which social and materially relevant meanings are assigned to certain
biological traits, whereas eye color is a biological trait to which no overriding social meaning has
been assigned. For good treatments of the social construction of race, see BELL, supra note 2, at 5-8;
Robert S. Chang, Critiquing "Race" and Its Uses: Critical Race Theory's Uncompleted Argument,
in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 87-96; IAN F.
HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) reprinted in CRT:
CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 626-34; MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WiNANT, RACIAL FORMATION
IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 9-13 (2d ed., 1994); Gotanda, supra note 2,
at 257-75; Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1994), reprinted in part in CRT:
CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 191-203. W.E.B. Du Bois anticipated this position. See The Con-
servation of Race, in W.E.B. DU BOIS SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, 1890-1919, 50-54
(Philip Foner ed., 1998); see generally FRANZ BOAS, RACE, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURE 3-195
(1940) (these pages include multiple essays discussing race).
27. This argument is not meant to suggest that the ideal society in the future would be a co-
lorblind society. An ideal society might be one that embraces and respects human diversity.
28. See BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE, supra note 25, at 193; Gotanda, supra note 2,
at 274; see also BELL, supra note 2, at 126-27; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, AN INTRODUCTION supra
note 1, at 21-22; Harris, supra note 1, at 1229-30; Harris, supra note 25 (arguing in reference to
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words, it maintains the oppressive conditions and lack of opportunities
for subordinated groups that continue to be structured by the historical
and modem use of race in law and throughout the society. It amounts to
what has been called "colorblind racism.
29
Colorblindness, or more specifically, "colorblind individualism,,
30
as an ideology applied in law, fully emerges after the civil rights move-
ment but has deep historical roots even in American law itself. One of
its earliest and clearest articulations is found in the dissent to the infa-
mous U.S. Supreme Court case, Plessy v. Ferguson.31  In Plessy, the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, enacted as part of the Civil War amendments
that abolished slavery, allowed the separate but equal treatment of racial-
ized people. Plessy thus made legal the practices of racial, "Jim Crow"
segregation in the United States32 that the civil rights movement, almost
one hundred years later, would challenge. Justice John Marshall Harlan,
the lone dissenter in the case, in rejecting the holding asserts the color-
blind claim: "[I]n the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens ... Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. 33 The separate but
equal legal doctrine of Plessy was overturned in the Brown v. Board of
conservative interpretations that race was not a factor in the aftereffects of Hurricane Katrina, that
colorblindness is a perspective that narrows the definition of race to that arising from the aberrant
individual's intentional action); Hernandez, supra note 2. From this colorblind perspective, the
response to the question of whether race played a role in the government's slow response to hurri-
cane victims, the argument is no one or group of individuals could be said with certainty to have
intentionally delayed governmental action. Of course this does not address more unconscious influ-
ences in individuals and it does not explain why, out of the 1.3 million people who make up the New
Orleans metropolitan area-all hit by the hurricane-the 120,000 or so people stranded in New
Orleans after the hurricane were overwhelmingly black? See Virginia R. Dominguez, Seeing and
Not Seeing: Complicity in Surprise, in SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING
KATRINA: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005),
http://understandingkatina.ssrc.org/Dominguez/pf/ (providing these statistics and making a similar
point); see also infra notes 297-316 (discussing class, race and Hurricane Katrina).
29. See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 137-66 (2001); LESLIE G. CARR, "COLOR-BLIND" RACISM 107-170 (1997).
30. This term is used to capture both the ideas of race neutrality and the emphasis in Ameri-
can law on the individual. For instance, Kevin Brown uses this term to capture these two different
dynamics in discussing the demise of school desegregation efforts in the U. S. See KEVIN DION
BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON
DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 103-28 (2005); see also John 0. Calmore, New Demograph-
ics and the Voting Rights Act: Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a Multi-
racing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1271-72 (2001) (discussing the way the Supreme Court is
transporting "individualized colorblindness" across different context and explaining why this is
ridiculous in the voting dilution context, a context that only makes sense in the terms of identifiable
groups and yet blind to white group bloc voting).
31. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987).
32. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed., 1974). "Jim
Crow" laws were laws that imposed racial separation in schools, common carriers, public accommo-
dations, and in public facilities generally, both governmental and private.
33. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Education case,34 decided in 1954, which made segregation in schools
unconstitutional.
The rediscovery in the seventies of colorblind notions in law, was
given a boost by the appropriation by conservative forces of colorblind
discourse within the civil rights movement, 35 as captured in the 1963
speech of Martin Luther King, Jr., a civil rights hero. King aspired to a
time when every person would be judged "by the content of his character
rather than the color of his skin." 36 However, while Dr. King believed,
worked, and died fighting for peace and racial and economic justice, the
application of legal colorblindness has worked to undermine that dream.
A central theme of Critical Race Theory, therefore, is to explore the ways
in which legal colorblindness, in supplanting overt legal racial ordering,
has not only allowed law to ignore the social and institutional structures
of oppression created historically and recreated presently in law and
practice but also has blunted efforts to dismantle the racial caste system,
working instead to maintain it. Critical Race Theory's main goal is the
liberation of minorities and other socially subordinated people; its stance
is one of "antisubordination.
37
Critical Race Theory supports its claim by analyzing cases, laws,
and legal patterns that unearth the many ways in which law constitutes
and/or supports the status quo of white racial power and black and non-
white subordination. For example, CRT scholars have examined the
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2d ed., 2004).
For consideration of the consequences of Brown, see generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
:EDUCATION (2004); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLING LEGACY (2001), reviewed by Carlo A. Pedriali, Under a Critical
Race Theory Lens, 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 93 (2005).
35. See BELL, supra note 2, at 115 (referring to modem-day colorblind ideology as a redis-
covered constitutional rationale). For early conservative misappropriations of the civil rights aspira-
tion as captured by King, see generally PAUL SEABURY, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (Barry Gross
ed., 1977); NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1975).
36. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 217, 219 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986), quoted in
CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xv. Dr. King was obviously speaking of judgments of per-
sonal moral worth, not about a theory of constitutional interpretation. Constitutional colorblindness
is part of the Supreme Court's rationale for the application of strict scrutiny to all racial classifica-
tions, even those intended to remedy the effects of discrimination. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); BELL, supra note 2, at 115-35.
37. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987), reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW, supra note 1, at 479-81; Ruth Colker,
Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005
(1986); Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Critical Race Theory, and "OutCrit" Perspectivity:
Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 399-409; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordina-
tion? Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VI1 and the LLRA. Not, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 395 (1993), reprinted in part in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 317-32 (Adrien Kathe-
rine Wing 1997) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM]; Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes,
Afterword to LatCrit V Symposium: LatCrit at Five: Institutionalizing a Post-Subordination Future,
78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1249, 1265-66 (2001).
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ways that past naturalization laws,38 together with cases such as Dred
Scott both constructed whiteness and defined it as a condition of citizen-
ship. 39 They have examined how current laws legitimate racial profiling
of black and other non-white peoples, thereby reinforcing elements of the
caste system developed throughout the nation's history.40 And they have
analyzed the ways in which race-neutral housing laws facilitated white
flight and suburban sprawl after the Brown decision, perpetuating in new
form the old pattern of racial residential segregation.41  From this per-
spective, CRT rejects the conventional claims of lawyers, judges, and
others that law, through the professional processes of reasoned analysis
of abstract rules such as equality, is neutral, objective, and distinct from
and outside the realm of politics and political choices.42 Having emerged
from a critique of civil rights, Critical Race theorists initially focused on
constitutional and civil rights issues. However, they now explore the
relationship between white racial power and law in a range of topics
from business law43 to international law."n
38. Uniform Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
39. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195 (1922); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 419-20
(1857). See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).
40. See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the
Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002); see, e.g., Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also BELL, supra note 2, at xx; William H. Buckman & John Lam-
berth, US. Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow?: Challenging Racial Profiles: Attacking Jim Crow on
the Interstate, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 387 (2001); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and
Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All
Other Traffic Offences: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 338
(1991), reprinted in part in CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 206-28; Katheryn K. F. Russell, "Driving
While Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717 (1999);
United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 114 (6th Cir. 1994) (Keith, J., dissenting).
41. John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-
Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1492-94 (1993), reprinted in part in SOCIAL JUSTICE:
PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 884-92 (Martha R. Mahoney, John 0. Calmore, &
Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2003) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE].
42. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV.
741, 746 (1994). See generally Phillips, supra note 4.
43. See, e.g., CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 138-177; Keith Aoki, The Stakes of Intellectual
Property Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 18, at 259-78; Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender
and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991), reprinted in
part in A WOMAN'S PLACE IS IN THE MARKETPLACE: GENDER AND ECONOMICS 295-318 (Emma
Coleman Jordan & Angela P. Harris eds., 2006) [hereinafter A WOMAN'S PLACE]; Ian Ayres, Fur-
ther Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 109 (1995); Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language
Fraud and English-Only ":: ehe Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027 (1996); Anthony R. Chase,
Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cotton Field to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 5, 6-7
(1995); Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725 (2004);
Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases of Consumer
Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. I (2003); Cheryl L. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993), reprinted in part in CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 279-87, and in CRT:
KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 276-91, and in A WOMAN'S PLACE, supra at 357-71; Emily M.S.
Houh, Critical Interventions: Towards an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good
Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 (2003); Blake Morant, The Relevance of Race and
Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889 (1997); Muriel Morisey,
Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89 (1993),
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In addition, CRT helped spawn the development of the Latina and
Latino Critical Theory (LatCrit)45 and Asian American critical legal
analyses and movements.46 By shifting the Critical Race Theory lens to
other racialized groups, these analyses brought in important discussions
of both historical and contemporary issues of citizenship and immigra-
tion law as sources of racial and ethnic subordination, as well as, for ex-
ample, language suppression and stereotypes (Latina/os) 47 or the model
minority myth (Asian Americans).48 These issues were less visible in the
original context of CRT's employment of the white over black paradigm
and the particularities of the African American experience as analytical
frameworks.
The LatCrit movement is particularly interesting because it explic-
itly incorporates and builds upon feminist legal insights and queer theory
as foundational philosophies, explores international issues, and explicitly
and consciously articulates the social justice position of antisubordina-
tion-a stance against all forms of oppression. Further, LatCrit scholars
reprinted in part in CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 160-64; David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of
Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1695 (2004); Mylinh Uy, Tax and Race: The
Impact on Asian Americans, 11 ASIAN L.J. 117 (2004); Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and
Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the
Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183 (1994), reprinted in part in CRT: CASES, supra
note 1, at 138-43, 165-68, 176-77.
44. See generally CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra
note 1, at 303-75; Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the "Third World" in Interna-
tional Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000), reprinted in part in SOCIAL
JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 880-82; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic
Law: Locating Latinas/os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361 (1996);
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, at 339-85; GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN
INTERNATIONAL READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2000) [hereinafter GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM]; Chantal Thomas, Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observa-
tions on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195 (2000).
45. See Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method
and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience - RaceCrits, QueerCrits, and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1266, 1266 (1999).
46. See generally WU, supra note 1; Chang, supra note 1, at 355; Margaret Chon & Donna E.
Arzt, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered Examining the Japanese American Civil Liber-
ties Cases on Their Sixtieth Anniversary: Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215
(2005); Frank H. Wu, The Arrival of Asian Americans: An Agenda for Legal Scholarship, 10 ASIAN
L.J. 1 (2003). Recently these scholars have called their work Asian American Jurisprudence. See,
e.g., John Hayakawa Torok, Asian American Jurisprudence: On Curriculum, 2005 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 635.
47. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Litera-
ture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1273 (1992), re-
printed in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 82-89.
48. Frank H. Wu, Changing America: Three Arguments About Asian Americans and the Law,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 811, 813-14 (1996); Chang, supra note I; Uy, supra note 43, at 131-32. See
generally NAZLI KHRIA, BECOMING ASIAN AMERICAN: SECOND-GENERATION CHINESE AND
KOREAN IDENTITIES (2002); DIANA TING LfU WU, ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS IN THE WORKPLACE
(1997); STACEY J. LEE, UNRAVELING THE "MODEL MINORITY": LISTENING TO ASIAN AMERICAN
YOUTH (1996).
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have established an institutional framework for the future development
of LatCrit and other Critical Race Theory scholarship.49
While feminist theory, particularly feminist legal theory and black
feminist theory, were inherent in the original Critical Race Theory schol-
arship through the work of people like Crenshaw and Angela Harris,50
Critical Race Feminism, a term coined originally by Richard Delgado,
and a field adopted and promoted specifically by Adrien Wing, has taken
off as a separate, newly-developing theory and body of scholarship.
51
Critical Race Feminism builds on Critical Race Theory as well as in-
sights specifically from black feminist theory and is also a leftist legal
critique that primarily focuses on the intersections of race, ethnicity,
and/or colonialism on the one hand and gender on the other. In addition,
it explores the international manifestations of racialized gender oppres-
sion. The exploration of the sex/gender system, generally, its relation-
ship to the racial order, and the living reality of sexual minorities of
color, coupled with Critical Race Theory's embrace of the larger social
justice project of working toward the liberation of all, has resulted in
many critical race theorists also examining the ways in which law subor-
dinates sexual minorities.52
Together these issues have led to insights about the ways in which
identity is multidimensional. For instance, critical race theorists, among
others, point out that people are not simply raced (black, white, yellow,
or "Hispanic"); they are also gendered, (masculine, feminine or trans-
gendered) and possess sexual identities (heterosexual, homosexual, or
bisexual), etc. From this perspective, every person's identity is multidi-
mensional. 53 This insight of multidimensionality goes further. The so-
49. LatCrit literature is readily available at the LatCrit website, Latina and Latino Critical
Theory (2004), http://personal.law.miami.edu/-fvaldes/latcrit/latcrit/index.html (listing, inter alia,
16 colloquia and symposia on LatCrit). See generally, THE LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 1;
Colloquium. Representing Latina/o Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA
L.J. 1 (1996); Panel: Latinalo Identity and Pan-Ethnicity: Toward LatCrit Subjectivities, 2 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 175 (1997); Joint Symposium: Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087
(1997).
50. See generally CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essential-
ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990), reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE
AND LAW, supra note 1, at 484-85, 539-43, and in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 253-66,
and in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 35, at 11 -18.
51. See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, at 1; GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM,
supra note 44; CRT: CUTrING EDGE, supra note 1, at 261-74; Adrien K. Wing & Christine A.
Willis, From Theory to Praxis: Black Women, Gays, and Critical Race Feminism, 4 AFR.-AM. L. &
POL'Y REP. 1 (1999); see also Women of Color in Legal Academia: A Biographic and Bibliographic
Guide, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1993).
52. See generally Hutchinson, supra note 19; Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Eth-
ics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of "'Sexual Orienta-
tion," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1997).
53. Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights - Rules and Reali-
ties and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605, 667-68 (1996). See
generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality, " "Multidimensionality, "
and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001),
reprinted in part in SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 4 1.
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cial structures of race, gender, sexuality, and class as systems of power
are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. They create multiple and inter-
secting positions of subordination for members of the groups they disad-
vantage. So for example, racism in the United States is patriarchal and
patriarchy in the United State is racist. As Dorothy Roberts points out,
some of the first laws passed in America involved changing the le-
gal/social practice of children inheriting the status of their fathers, to
children inheriting the status of their mother if their mothers were (black)
slaves, while patrolling and later prohibiting sexual relations between
white women and black men. "Black women [were forced to] produce[]
children who were legally Black to replenish the master's supply of
slaves . .. [while] White women [were compelled to] produce[] white
children to continue the master's legacy."54 Black men passed on little."
The racism that both black men and women experienced was thus, also
gendered. To these analyses, scrutiny of the specific relations of class
could be added as wc ll as an analysis of compulsory heterosexuality. As
such, the structure of black oppression was and has remained multidi-
mensional.
CRT theorists have often explored the material harms caused by
race, gender, and sexuality as mutually reinforcing social systems em-
bedded in and constructed, albeit not exclusively, by law; and they have
suggested that these systems reinforce the reproduction of class within
the United States. However, they have not in any sustained manner theo-
rized the ways in which class functions as a site for identity formation, or
the various ways in which class as a specific function of the creation and
distribution of resources, operates both independently and mutually with
other subordinating structures to limit the material well-being of people
including racial and other minorities. These kinds of analyses await fur-
ther development and constitute a necessary future direction of CRT.
II. INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Many scholars have described the origins of Critical Race Theory.
They suggest that it owes its intellectual genesis to three intellectual
movements. The first is the civil rights movement and the critical as-
sessments of its effects in changing the actual conditions of black life.
Second, CRT builds upon the themes and critical understandings of law
exposed by the Critical Legal Studies movement. 56 And third, it incor-
54. Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and the Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 8 (1993), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, VOLUME 1I (Frances
E. Olsen ed., 1995). See generally JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW:
BLACK WOMEN, WORK AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985).
55. Presumably where black men were free and had children with a free woman, he passed on
his legacy.
56. See generally CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1; CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1.
For a discussion on the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, see generally CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (Jones Boyle ed., 1992); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989);
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porates many of the insights and theorizing of feminist legal and other
feminist scholars.
57
Richard Delgado traces CRT genesis to the early seventies when
several legal scholars began to express doubt about the effectiveness of
the civil rights movement's legal strategy to racial justice. For instance,
Derrick Bell, considered a forefather of CRT, in an essay in 1976, sug-
gested that civil rights attorneys' approach to litigating school cases for
purposes of desegregating entire school districts (and balancing them
racially) might be at odds with their clients'-African American fami-
lies-very real hopes and concrete goals of immediately improving their
children's educations. 58 In another article, Bell argued that the result in
the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, although heralded as a
triumph of the civil rights legal strategy, might be better explained by
what he called "interest convergence,"" a theme that has become a
mainstay of critical race analysis. 60 Brown, he suggested, came about
not because of some belated realization by whites of the harms black
children suffered under segregation, 6' but rather, because of its value to
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1987); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES:
ARTICLES, NOTES, AND BOOK REVIEWS SELECTED FROM THE PAGES OF THE HARVARD REVIEW
(1986); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Symposium: Critical Legal Studies, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1-674 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE
L.J. 1515 (1991).
57. See generally CRT: CUTrING EDGE, supra note 1, at 499-550.
58. Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976), reprinted in CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1,
at 5-19, and in part in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 228-38, and in SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra
note 4 1, at 328-33; see DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 30-3 1.
59. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980), reprinted in CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 20-29 [hereinaf-
ter Bell, Interest Convergence Dilemma]; see also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 51-74 (1987). Bell's theory had a precursor in the "Slave
Power" theory constructed by antislavery elements, such as future Chief Justice Samuel P. Chase,
prior to the Civil War. They argued that the South was under the political control of slave owners
who, through the Democratic Party, dominated all branches of the national government, which was
its tool for the denial, in the interests of slavery, of the freedoms of Northern whites. This became
part of the ideology of the Republican Party whose original commitment was to prevent the exten-
sion of slavery. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-102 (1970); MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE POLITICAL
CRISIS OF THE 1850s (1978).
60. Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 17, at 124; see, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs
Plan and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What to
Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1583 (2004); Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimina-
tion Under Title VII after Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J.
937 (2005); John Hayakawa Torok, "'Interest Convergence" and the Liberalization of Discrimina-
tory Immigration and Naturalization Laws Affecting Asian Americans, 1943-1965, 1995 CHINESE
AMERICA: HISTORY & PERSPECTIVES 1-15; Marlia Banning, Critical Race Theory and Interest
Convergence in the Desegregation of Higher Education, in RACE IS - RACE ISN'T: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY AND QUALITATIVE STUDIES IN EDUCATION (Laurence Parker, Donna Deyhle, & Sofia
Villenas eds., 1999).
61. Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 59, at 523-24. The Brown decision also
ignored, and apparently could not contemplate, the harms segregation visited upon white students.
These harms as Kevin Brown suggests include a false sense of superiority. See BROWN, supra note
30, at 164-67. He notes that prominent social scientists filed an amicus brief in the Brown cases
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whites-a value and interest that converged with black aspirations for
freedom and well-being.62 The decision, he suggests, was intended to
and "helped to provide immediate credibility to America's struggle with
Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third
world peoples. 63 Bell's argument that the goal of the U.S. government
in advocating for the decision in Brown had little to do with improving
the education or life chances of black children, rang particularly accurate
in 2004 when, fifty years after the decision, education in the United
States was found to be as segregated (and disadvantaging) in terms of
race as it had been at the time of Brown. 64 Bell later argued that racism
was pervasive in the American social order, that law was imbued with it,
and that racism was a permanent feature of American society including
its legal system. 65
suggesting that segregation hurt all children both black and white, not simply black children. The
scientists noted that children taught prejudice learn:
to gain personal status in an unrealistic and non-adaptive way. When comparing them-
selves to members of the minority group, they are not required to evaluate themselves in
terms of the more basic standards of actual personal ability and achievement. The culture
[allows] ... them to direct their feelings of hostility and aggression against whole groups
of people ... perceived as weaker than themselves. They often develop patterns of guilt
feeling, rationalizations and other mechanisms which they must use in an attempt to pro-
tect themselves from recognizing the essential injustice ....
Id. at 165. Brown concludes that "if segregation created a false sense of inferiority within blacks,
then it must have also generated the psychological harm of a false sense of superiority in whites."
Id. at 165-66. He explains this as the dual psychological harm of segregation, the two different sides
of the same delusion suffered by the entire society. Id. at 166.
The difficulties experienced by minority teachers (as well as women) in the classroom in
many ways capture this harm in that white students who often know little about the subject matter of
the class act as if there is little a minority teacher can teach them. Consider Derrick Bell's experi-
ence at Stanford Law School in 1986 when first year law students presumed to know more about
constitutional law than Professor Bell did and therefore critiqued the class as not covering the appro-
priate subject matter. The Stanford administration, though later apologizing, initially capitulated to
the student's estimation. See Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspective, STAN. L. SCH.
J., May 9, 1986, at 5. In fact these teachers have written quite a bit about their classroom difficulties
as minority teachers and the other challenges they face in the context of the predominately white
male American law school. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors'
Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 360 (1989); Okianer Christian
Dark, Just My 'Magination, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 21, 23 (1993); Trina Grillo, Tenure, and
Minority Women Law Professors: Separating the Strands, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 747, 753-54 (1997);
Reginald Leamon Robinson, Teaching from the Margins: Race as a Pedagogical Sub-text: A Criti-
cal Essay, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 151, 152 (1997). For the perspective of critical students, see
Kathryn Pourmand Nordick, Essay: A Critical Look at Student Resistance to Non-Traditional Law
School Professors, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (2005).
62. Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 59, at 524.
63. Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 59, at 524; see also Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1998), reprinted in CRT: CUTTING
EDGE, supra note 1, at 106-17 (noting that the government stated this in their amicus brief submitted
in the Brown case and further substantiating Bell's intuition).
64. This point was made during celebrations marking the fiftieth anniversary of Brown. See,
e.g., Greg Toppo, Integrated Schools Still a Dream 50 Years Later, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2004, at
Al.
65. BELL, supra note 2, at 1; see Bell, supra note 59, at 518; DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTrOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 3 (1993).
Ignored in the rush to proclaim color blindness as the judicial panacea to claims of racial
injustice is the fact that virtually all policies adopted as protections against racial injus-
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At about the same time, the Critical Legal Studies movement based
in the legal academy was growing. This movement questioned the entire
edifice of law as an objective arbiter of social conflict distinct from the
messiness of politics and political choices. This movement, which in-
cluded scholars such as Alan Freeman, Peter Gabel, Duncan Kennedy,
and Mark Tushnet, successfully demonstrated the ways in which legal
rules were, in and of themselves, not determinative of a particular re-
sult.66 They showed that, for any given rule, there were multiple, con-
trasting and conflicting rules whose resolution required actors to make
choices. These choices were political ones that generally reflected, sup-
ported, and legitimized the social power of dominant classes.67
However, they rejected what they termed "vulgar instrumentalist"
or "structuralist" accounts of law that understand it as merely a tool and
reflection of bourgeoisie/elite interests and ideas, or as a merely super-
structural phenomenon determined by the underlying economic base.
Rather, drawing in part on the Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio
Gramsci's idea of hegemony, 68 Critical Legal Studies scholars under-
stand law as a complex system with many functions, one of which is to
exercise and simultaneously legitimate the use of institutional violence
within the prevailing social arrangements in a way that gains the consent
tices suffered by blacks and other people of color in this country have actually proven to
be of more value to whites.
BELL, supra note 2, at xx; see also Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992);
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism -After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial
Epoch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393 (1990), reprinted in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 2-8
[hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism].
66. See THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 18, at 1-7 (providing a good overview of Critical
Legal Studies themes). This book has been revised several times. The first edition in 1982 was
updated and followed by a revised edition in 1990, and then again in a third edition in 1998, supra
note 1. I like each of these editions but find the 1982 publication the best for introducing many of
the basic CLS concepts and initial ideas. In this edition the ideas tend to be more fully explained,
whereas in later publications some key insights are merely summarized. The later editions, however,
introduce new thinking developed in a covered area and introduce additional essays that explore a
wider breadth of legal fields.
67. See Victor Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra
note 18, at 686; see, e.g., ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEWIS & RICHARD DELGADO,
JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 402-
13 (2002).
68. Hegemony is an illusive concept, but is to be counterposed to "direct domination" as a
paradoxical "'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direc-
tion imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position
and function in the world of production." SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCI 12, 161, 170, 416-17 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971); see also
Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 18, at 647-48; Douglass Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV.
515, 515-16 (2000); ALAN HUNT, DICHOTOMY AND CONTRADICTION IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, in
MARXISM AND LAW 86-87 (Piers Beime & Richard Quinney eds., 1982); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio
Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32, 32 (1982). For an application of Gramsci's concept
of hegemony to antebellum slavery, see EUGENE V. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD
THE SLAVES MADE 25-49 (1976), reprinted in part in MARXISM AND LAW, supra at 279-94.
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and acquiescence of the subordinated to their conditions. 69  Law does
this political work by deploying a distinct and elaborate discourse and
body of knowledge (popularly perceived as objective and apolitical) to
justify its decisions. These decisions, while generally supporting the
power of elite groups, sometimes actually restrain the exercise of power
and occasionally provide justice to ordinary people. In doing so, how-
ever, they lend legitimacy to law and to many of the existing social ar-
rangements and institutions of which law is a part. Thus, while there
may indeed be "a difference between arbitrary power and [the] rule of
law," law may also be "in some part sham.",
70
So for example, in a path-breaking article, Alan Freeman argued
that antidiscrimination law offered a credible measure of tangible pro-
gress without in any way disturbing the basic class structure of the
American society. 71 This was accomplished by using concepts such as
intent, fault, colorblindness and formal equality, which over time ulti-
mately located the problem of racism in the intentional actions of bad
actors instead of the established caste system that included the conscious
and unconscious habitual human and institutional practices of racial or-
dering. The remedy to the problem, defined in this manner, was to com-
pel the bad actors to act differently instead of changing or dismantling
the caste system of embedded racial arrangements.72 Thus, although
judges declared that law would treat everyone the same, they did so
without regard to and so without changing the conditions that stratified
people(s) socially and materially in the first place. As such, antidis-
crimination law outlawed the obvious and explicit manifestations of ra-
cism (the "white only" signs of the Jim Crow era) and thereby provided
credible evidence that the law and the basic structure of society were fair,
69. My notion here of legal discourse as backed by violence and justifying its use comes from
Robert Cover. See generally, Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). I
thank my colleague John Henry Schlegal for pointing out that I should clarify this.
70. Rabinowitz, supra note 67, at 688 (citing E.P. Thompson, the celebrated English radical
historian who acknowledged the element of false consciousness induced by the legal order, but
affirmed the rule of law as a potential basis for progressive change; see E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 265-66 (1975), reprinted in part in MARXISM AND
LAW, supra note 68, at 130-37). Another of Gramsci's concepts is the "organic intellectual," who is,
not a social technician (like most lawyers) but rather someone who instructs popular consciousness
"precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the
intellectual progress of the race and not only of small intellectual groups." SELECTIONS FROM THE
PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI, supra note 68, at 332-33. For a CRT application of
these concepts which regards Martin Luther King as one such organic intellectual, see ANTHONY E.
COOK, BEYOND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE RECONSTRUCTIVE THEOLOGY OF DR. MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., in CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 90-91.
71. Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978), reprinted in MARXISM
AND LAW, supra note 68, at 210-35 [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination]; see
also Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainity, Contradiction, Ra-
tionalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 18, at 285-311.
72. Freeman also suggests that the Court's momentary flirtation with attacking the actual




without disturbing the structural and systemic manifestations, including
the maldistribution of resources, of that same deeply embedded racism.
And finally, though perhaps not initially obvious, CRT owes a debt
to yet another school of thought: feminism. As Delgado notes, CRT
builds upon feminist "insights into the relationship between power and
the construction of social roles, as well as the unseen, largely invisible
collection of patterns and habits that make up patriarchy and other types
of domination." 73 In addition, the idea of antisubordination, the central
stance of "race crits," can be traced not only to race scholars but also to
feminist scholarship.74
III. CONFLICT AS AN ENGINE OF CRT INTELLECTUAL AND INSTITU-
TIONAL GROWTH
These ideas, according to Kimberl6 Crenshaw, met in the actual
persons of students attending Harvard Law School in 1981 where a
struggle raged over the meaning of race. This struggle was a part of a
larger continuum of student movements at universities in the 1970s and
1980s advocating for ethnic study departments, against South African
apartheid, and for diversity in student admissions and faculty staffing.75
The struggle implicated notions of race consciousness, affirmative ac-
tion, and the presumptive existence of meritocracy and proved to be a
catalyst for the theory's institutionalization. It also began a pattern of
conflict that would engender crucial CRT insights and fuel its growth
and entrenchment.
Specifically, the conflict at Harvard led to the Alternative Course,
described by Crenshaw as CRT's first institutional expression. Second,
conflict with Critical Legal Studies helped to inspire the formal estab-
lishment of the CRT workshop. Third, internal conflict and critique over
the commitments and focus of the workshop led to the exploration of the
experiences of additional racialized and oppressed groups. The later
founding of LatCrit, resulting in part from these conflicts, brought about
concerns about fragmentation of the movement. 76 Nevertheless, it em-
bodied and represented a continuing site for the germination of "Race
Crit" insights. And last, the conflict over Proposition 20977 and its vi-
sions of colorblind justice in the context of the University of California
Los Angeles Law School led to CRT's entrenchment.
73. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 5.
74. See supra note 37.
75. Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory's Cutting Edge: Key
Movements That Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377 (2000), reprinted in
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 32-70.
76. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1356-57.
77. California Civil Rights Initiative, California Ballot Proposition 209 (adopted Nov. 6,
1986) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31) [hereinafter California Proposition 209].
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A. Alternative Course: Confronting Colorblindness
After the departure of Derrick Bell from Harvard Law School in
1981, a group of students asked the administration to continue to offer
his semester-long course on Constitutional Law and Minority Issues.7 8
This course, according to Crenshaw, fore-grounded race in the context of
legal issues rather than analyzing laws from the typical liberal individual
rights perspective of "how do we get blacks some rights" while reconcil-
ing other vested interests. 79 Further it assessed laws on the basis of their
effectiveness in changing the actual conditions of black subordination
while also analyzing the ways in which many of these same laws actually
contributed to racial subordination.80
These students, seeing the hole in the curriculum created by Bell's
departure as an opportunity to "desegregate the faculty," asked the ad-
ministration to hire a person of color to teach the course. 81 The Dean's
response, in particular, was instructive to students who later institutional-
ized Critical Race Theory. He questioned any value a course on "Consti-
tutional Law and Minorities Issues" might add to a curriculum that al-
ready offered courses such as constitutional law and employment dis-
crimination law, both of which dealt with "those" issues. 82 The Dean
asked "why the students would not prefer an excellent white professor
over a mediocre black one." 83 And he suggested that there were no peo-
ple of color in the country "qualified" to be hired at Harvard Law
School.84 His comment reflected a particular perspective that provoked
what later came to be key CRT themes. First, his comments suggested
that qualifications or merit were something other than socially defined
worth that themselves might embody racial meanings and structure.85
Second, although this merit supposedly had nothing to do with color be-
cause merit was colorblind;86 it was nonetheless captured by the then
current predominantly white professors and not in any black professors
in the country at the time. 87 And, third, that Harvard, as a race-neutral
78. CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1348. Bell later returned
to Harvard Law School. During his second stay, he staged a protest in support of Harvard hiring
black women. The protest is documented in part in his book, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY. See
generally DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTOR
(1994).
79. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1347.
80. CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xxi; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1347.
81. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1345.
82. CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xxi.
83. Id. at xx.
84. Id.; Harris, supra note 1, at 1221 n.10.
85. See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85
CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1452-1453 (1997).
86. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 25, at 911-12 (on colorblindness).
87. See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1348-49 (discussing the pool problem); see also CHO &
WESTLEY, supra note 73, at 46 (explaining that the "pool argument" was not credible and noting that
the percentage of faculty of color teaching in law schools grew by 85% in two years (1989-1991)
after the first nationwide strike by students advocating for faculty diversity).
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institution, supposedly did not hire people on the basis of color, and yet
the faculty was overwhelmingly white. Crenshaw notes: "This framing
of the issue gave many of us involved in that struggle a clear sense about
how conceptions such as colorblindness and merit functioned as rhetoric
of racial power in presumptively race-neutral institutions."
88
Harvard responded to the students' request by hiring two distin-
guished civil rights lawyers, neither of whom was a person of color, to
teach a three-week mini course. The students rejected this offer, setting
off a national debate on affirmative action. 9 Instead they organized an
alternative course in which they invited a number of professors to teach
various parts of the course. 90 Several of the participants later became
prominent figures in CRT, including such scholars as Denise Carty-
Benia, Richard Delgado, Linda Green, Neil Gotanda, and Charles Law-
rence, who were already law professors, Kimberld Crenshaw, a law stu-
dent, and Mari Matsuda, a graduate student at the time. Crenshaw marks
the "Alternative Course" as CRT's first institutional expression. Its sec-
ond institutional expression was in 1989 when Crenshaw, together with
Stephanie Phillips, Neil Gotanda and others and with the support of
Richard Delgado and the backing of David Trubek, then the director of
the Institute of Legal Studies at Wisconsin, organized the first CRT
workshop in Wisconsin. 91 Budding scholars such as Angela Harris were
to attend this workshop.
92
B. Conflict with CLS: The African American Experience as an Analyti-
cal and Methodological Framework
In the intervening time, many of these and other future "race crits"
had been meeting informally, and in separate sessions, at the Critical
Legal Studies meetings, retreats, and summer camps. This engagement
had both an intellectual and institutional contribution to CRT. First, the
CRT workshop was patterned after the Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
summer workshops involving small groups of people to "explore a range
of topics. ' 93 Further, future race crits had clashed with CLS scholars in
the 1985 and 1987 conferences, when they sought to critique CLS both at
the level of practice and theory. At the level of practice, they questioned
the whiteness of CLS (as well as the elite maleness of it) and the way
these social positionings affected, and potentially limited, CLS analyses.
At the level of theory, race crits questioned one of the major theoretical
88. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1345.
89. CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xxi.
90. Id.
91. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1361.
92. Id. at 1361 n. 19. Other participants at the Wisconsin workshop, according to Stephanie
Phillips, included Paulette Caldwell, John Calmore, Harlon Dalton, Kendall Thomas, and Patricia
Williams. Id.
93. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1359.
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critiques of CLS scholarship, the trashing of rights. 94 Some CLS schol-
ars argued that the idea of legal rights and "rights talk"-"I have this or
that right"-engaged in by the legal and popular public alike, actually
obscured and narrowed the actual concrete conflicts that underlie the
talk. Further, they suggested that rights talk limited people's ability to
creatively imagine alternative frameworks and solutions to problems that
might include measures or activities outside the realm of law. Some
CLS scholars thus advocated abandoning and trashing rights. 95 Future
race crits partly rejected this line of argument because it neglected the
reality that blacks and other people of color had in fact used the language
of legal rights through the civil rights movement to effect some change in
their social treatment, even if using the rights discourse had failed to alter
the fundamental conditions of their oppression.
96
In using the lens of the African American experience to critically
examine and challenge the CLS critique of rights, African American
insights and experience became a central part of Critical Race Theory's
analytical framework. Further, testing CLS insights against the actual
experiences and perspectives of African Americans, as embodied in the
civil rights movement for instance, informed CRT's methodology. And,
use of the African American experience also arguably fueled CRT's op-
timism and commitment to the progressive use of law and to the modern-
ist ideals of justice, equality, and dignity.
Nonetheless, CLS scholars' hostile resistance to this critique, and
the maelstrom it created, cast a shadow on the race crits' continued en-
gagement with CLS. In doing so, it sowed the seeds that a leftist, critical
law engagement with race required its own space. The critical theory
race workshop became that space.
94. See generally Minority Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987) (including articles by Richard Delgado, Mar Matsuda, Patricia Williams,
and Harlon Dalton); Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, RaceReform, and Retrenchment: Transforma-
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1356-86 (1988), re-
printed in part in CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 27-38; Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar:
Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 302
(1987).
95. See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 71; Peter Gabel, The
Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1563, 1590 (1984); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 387, 427 (1984); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993), re-
printed in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 549-55; Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1386, 1382-83 (1984). The CLS critique of rights, just as some other CLS
ideas, was drawn from the Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s. See Elizabeth Mensch, The His-
tory of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 18, at 34-35; see, e.g., Felix
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
96. CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xxiii-xxiv; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN
INTRODUCTION supra note 1, at 23-25; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991), reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW,
supra note 1, at 35-36, 558-64; Crenshaw, supra note 94, at 1334; Phillips, supra note 4, at 1249;
GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER, supra note 44, at 3. Some in
CLS by now acknowledge the partial validity of the CRT counter-critique of their rights critique.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 68, at 657-58.
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C. Internal Conflict within the CRT Workshop: Expanding the Analyti-
cal Framework and Building the Commitment to Antisubordination
The critical race workshop met annually from 1989 until 1997.
97
Attendance at the workshop was by application and "invitation only"--a
policy that contributed to the critique of CRT as elitist.98 However, ac-
cording to Phillips, the policy was meant to facilitate sustained engage-
ment over a five-day period of a small group of people committed to
"radical transformative politics." 99 As such, the workshop did not issue
"a general invitation to all legal scholars of color, no matter how conser-
vative or parochial, to simply come hang out."' 100  Rather, she suggests,
this was the workshop's attempt to institute what Frank Valdes later
called "a move from color to consciousness," the idea that "alliances are
best built on shared substantive commitments, perhaps stemming from
similar experiences . . .with subordination, rather than traditional fault
lines like race or ethnicity.' 0'1  But, this principle was not extended to
include white scholars with similar commitments. White scholars were
excluded from participating in the workshop, a decision which generated
debate as to whether this was a pragmatic attempt to construct safe space
and inhibit the reproduction of white racial hierarchy, or simply an un-
principled decision.' 02 In either case, the question became moot with the
cessation of annual CRT workshops and the almost simultaneous found-
ing of the annual LatCrit conferences with its commitment to anti-
essentialist practice and its open-door policy that welcomed whites. 103
LatCrit developed in part in response to the conflicts in the work-
shop over two primary issues. 04 According to Phillips, the first issue,
erupting during the 1990 workshop, was whether CRT's commitment to
97. The reason for the cessation of the CRT workshops, as far as I can tell, was that the work-
shop lacked a firm institutional framework to perpetuate its continuation. CRT scholars attending a
workshop would be asked or volunteer to host the next workshop at their school the following year.
A committee would then be established to guide the program. This differed from the process even-
tually established by LatCrit conference where host were identified and secured two years in ad-
vance and worked with standing officers and officials.
At the 1997 CRT workshop, Robert Westley, a coordinator of the workshop together with
Sumi Cho, approached Stephanie Phillips about hosting the CRT workshop for the following year.
1, who was attending the CRT workshop for the first time and was at that time an adjunct faculty
member at the University at Buffalo Law School, encouraged her. Stephanie, however was always
reluctant to host the conference again, having hosted a workshop in the early nineties. I did not push
her on this and later went on to host another project. Thus, we unwittingly became part of the story
of the workshop's demise.





103. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1362-63; Phillips, supra note 4, at 1249 n.4.
104. Phillips, supra note 4, at 1251-52; see generally Francisco Valdes, Foreword. Latina/o
Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From
Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Valdes, Ethnicities]; see also Fran-
cisco Valdes, Under Construction - LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 1087, 1090 (1997) [hereinafter Valdes, Under Construction].
2006] 349
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 84:2
racial justice included a commitment to justice and liberation from other
forms of oppression, particularly the oppression of gay, lesbian, and
transgendered people. 105 It took, she suggests, almost eight years for the
workshop to fully embrace the position that antiracial struggle does or
should include the fight against oppression of sexual minorities. 106 The
second issue involved many of the nonblack people of color participants
at the 1992 workshop challenging the workshop's almost exclusive focus
on the history and conditions of African Americans to the exclusion of
the conditions of nonblack/nonwhite people. Phillips suggests that this
was one of the earliest critiques of what is typically known as the black-
white paradigm, 107 but which came to be called the white over black
paradigm 10 8 to emphasize the hierarchal ordering of race and alluding to
its inclusion of other groups in between whites and blacks. 109 Unlike the
issue of sexuality, she notes that the collective response of the workshop
to this critique was confessed ignorance," ° apologies and the embar-
rassment of some who perceived their actions as CRT having done to
nonblack peoples of color what CLS did to them. She argues that the
workshop thereafter began to explore the experiences of other racialized
groups and came to agree that:
[R]acism is not only historical slavery, Jim Crow laws and gerry-
mandered voting districts in the South; it is also immigration laws
and internment camps; it is stolen land grants and silenced languages;
105. Phillips, supra note 4, at 1250.
106. Id. at 1250-51.
107. Id. at 1252. Many scholars have critiqued and examined the limits of the white/black or
white over black paradigm. See, e.g., Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race, supra note 17, at
1272; Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61, 81-82 (1997); Juan
F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial
Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1220, 1254 (1997) (arguing that the black/white paradigm promotes
the invisibility and marginalized Latina/o experiences). Devon W. Carbado has surveyed and exam-
ined a variety of these critiques. See Devon W. Carbado, Critical Race Studies: Race to the Bottom,
49 UCLA L. REv. 1283, 1305-12. I agree that there are limitations to the paradigm, it cannot possi-
bly capture the many valences of race in America. See Athena D. Mutua, Mapping Intellec-
tual/Political Foundations and Future Self Critical Directions: Shifting Bottoms and Rotating
Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMt L. REV. 1177,
1179-80 (1999) [hereinafter Mutua, Shifting Bottoms]. However, I see the black experience and
blackness as central to and paradigmatic of a colorized racial system in which blackness or anything
but blackness is the chief obsession of white power. Id. at 1181-82. See also Harris, supra note 25,
at 916 ("[T]he Black/White paradigm may not accurately reflect racial demographics, because, in
part, it does not seek to do so. Instead, it describes racial power."). Further, I see no problem in
focusing on the African American experience, or the Latina/o experience, or any other group histo-
ries or experiences for that matter. It seems to me there is a difference between a practical focus -
concentrating your attention or efforts on one set of experiences-and assuming that this one set of
experiences is the whole or represent all there is. See Athena D. Mutua, Theorizing Progressive
Black Masculinities, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES 34 (Athena D. Mutua ed., 2006) [here-
inafter PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES] (discussing the multiple struggles inherent in a project
to transform the structures of domination that order American society, and noting the difference
between a practical focus on one struggle, and assuming that it is the only one as opposed to part of a
larger struggle).
108. Phillips, supra note 4, at 1252.
109. Mutua, Shifting Bottoms, supra note 107, at 1189.
110. Phillips, supra note 4, at 1253.
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it is standardized tests based on standardized culture; it is invisibility
and lost identity. III
The critique of the white over black paradigm opened the window
of recognition into the ways that the racialization of other groups in-
volved the interplay of laws and practices not readily exposed by looking
at the domestic experiences and conditions of blacks in the United States.
It thus, opened doors for CRT to examine the relationship between race
and ethnicity, racism, and nativisim, and racism, nationalism, and coloni-
alism. "1 2 It also brought into focus laws related to immigration, citizen-
ship, foreignness, language, and assimilation, among other issues as they
related to U.S. foreign policy, and transnational and international law.
These insights together with the way in which some Latina/o schol-
ars, such as Francisco Valdes, experienced the workshop conflicts led
them to institutionalize a separate space for the exploration of issues
germane to Latina/o communities and Latina/o identity. 1 3 The insights
also led to a call for (initially made by Robert Chang) and the subsequent
development of a line of Asian American legal scholarship.' '4 Further,
these insights intermittently drew in scholars who understood the Native
American experience both in terms of national oppression and racial op-
pression.'" 5 And finally it led to and encompassed work that explored
whiteness as a practice of exclusion and genocide, as a hidden norm and
as a site of unearned privilege by whites through the work of "white
crits.
, 116
The establishment of the LatCrit annual conference together with
the development of other related scholarship raised concerns over the
fragmentation of Critical Race Theory and the potential explosion of
multiple identity categories and projects. 117 However, not only did these
111. Id. at 1254.
112. For those CRT theorists who were familiar with black nationalist discourses, for example,
which understood black America as an internal colony and pushed Pan-Africanism, these theorists
may have made the connections between racism, nativism, and colonialism, even in the context of
the African American experience.
113. Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at 8-9.
114. See Chang, supra note 1, at 1247-49; Aoki, supra note 1, at 1476-79.
115. See, e.g., ROBERTA. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990), reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra
note 1, at 169-72; Robert A. Williams, Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 237 (1987), reprinted in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 98-109.
116. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING
BEHIND THE MIRROR 316 (1997); RUTH FRANKENBERG, DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM (1997); PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE
PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN
WOMEN'S STUDIES, reprinted in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 23; DAVID R.
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING
CLASS (1991); Barbara Flagg, "'Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 956-57 (1993).
117. See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 6;
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1364. See generally, Bryant, supra note 7.
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developments spur and contribute many important and necessary intel-
lectual insights, they expanded CRT's analytical framework to include
other racialized or otherwise oppressed groups' experiences."18  It also
expanded CRT's commitment to the liberation of black and other op-
pressed people of color to include a commitment to the liberation of all
oppressed and subordinated peoples.
Though critical race scholarship continued to grow through individ-
ual scholarship and group-initiated symposia, the founding of LatCrit
filled an institutional gap left by the cessation of the annual CRT work-
shop. Even though various iterations of CRT workshops have since
been held sporadically, another more permanent institutional framework
for promulgating Critical Race Theory has not developed. 119
D. UCLA, Proposition 209 and the Entrenchment of CRT: Confronting
the Whiteness of Colorblindness Again
CRT continues to become more entrenched in the legal academy.
Many law schools now offer courses in CRT. 120 In 2002, the University
of California Los Angeles (UCLA) established the first concentration in
CRT offered by an elite law school. 121 This event, like the birth of CRT,
owes its establishment to the racialized conflict over affirmative action
generated by California's Proposition 209 and the ways in which this
played out in the institutional context of UCLA. Proposition 209 made
illegal the consideration of race in California schools' admissions pol-
icy. 22  The result was a significant decline in minorities attending
UCLA.123 The Proposition appealed to and enforced an ideology of co-
118. One tension that arose with this expansion was whether critical race theory should main-
tain the black experience as a central focus or whether the CRT label should represent and act as an
umbrella group for all of the different racial and other antisubordination projects. This idea was
broached at the third annual conference of LatCrit where a panel explored whether a separate "black
crit" enterprise should be established and devoted to the African American experience, and the
experiences of others perceived as racially black such as black Latinos. Phillips, supra note 4, at
1251 n.10. Phillips suggested CRT be an umbrella group but seemed simultaneously opposed to
establishing yet another separate critical race/black enterprise. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 1254-
55. As a practical matter, CRT seems to serve as an umbrella label but one that is often qualified
with the term "related scholarship," an approach I have tentatively adopted in this piece. See, e.g.,
Harris, supra, note 1, at 1215 (also using these terms). At the same time, CRT has maintained a
central focus on the African American experience, with analysis of other racialized experiences
captured by the labels of LatCrit, Asian American Legal Scholarship, etc. This centrality, in part is
due to how CRT, though always multicultural in membership, developed but also because the Afri-
can American experience is often viewed as paradigmatic of race in the U.S. See supra note 107.
119. For instance, scholars have held subsequent iterations of the workshop at the American
University Washington College of Law. These were distinct from the Critical Race Theory Confer-
ence held at Yale in 1997.
120. In a survey conducted by LatCrit in 2002, some 23 law schools (out of approximately 180
ABA approved law schools) had courses called or related to Critical Race Theory. See Robert S.
Chang, "Forget the Alamo ". Race Courses as a Struggle over History and Collective Memory, 13
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 113 (2002) (LatCrit 2002 symposium).
121. Harris, supra note 1, at 1215-16.
122. Id. at 1221-25.
123. Id. at 1223-25.
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lorblindness.124 But as Cheryl Harris notes, "the ideology ... could not
hide from view what was before our very eyes; racial diversity was erod-
ing."' 125 In fact, the imposition of colorblind rules in the community con-
text of UCLA revealed, what much of CRT implies-that, given the
normative and social structure of the United States, colorblindness is a
proxy for whiteness. Harris describes UCLA after Proposition 209:
Given the fact that the school is physically located in southern Cali-
fornia-an area teeming with racial complexity-the virtual absence
of the full range of diversity within its walls is a constant and stark
reminder of the entrenched nature of racial difference in terms of ge-
ography, educational opportunity, and access. Admission into the
law school community is defined and constituted by rules that cap-
ture and reinforce certain background difference and inequalities,
126particularly those regarding race and class. ... However, color-
blindness does not in fact ignore race; it rests upon and reflects an in-
vestment in a particular conception of race in which race is divested
of its historical, societal, or experiential meaning. 127
In reaction, the UCLA faculty, as Cheryl Harris explains, after seri-
ous debate, decided to establish a CRT concentration called Critical Race
Studies. 128 They did so in part to signal UCLA's continuing commit-
ment to racial equality despite Proposition 209.129 Thus, while propo-
nents of 209 pushed color-blindness as an appropriate approach to race,
they made the color of colorblindness clear-whiteness; and further en-
trenched critical race consciousness of difference and Critical Race The-
ory in the legal academy.
IV. CRT TENETS AND METHODOLOGY
The basic tenets of Critical Race Theory remain true to the original
ideas discussed in the 1990 CRT workshop. With little modification,
Critical Race Theory:
1. holds that racism is pervasive and endemic to, rather than a de-
viation from, American norms; 
130
2. [rejects] dominant claims of meritocracy, neutrality, objectivity
and color-blindness;
124. Id. at 1229-30.
125. Id. at 1230.
126. Id. at 1229.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1232-34.
129. Id. at 1230.
130. As W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the
color-line." W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 7 (Henry Louis Gates Jr. & Terri Hume
Oliver eds., 1999) (1903).
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3. [rejects] ahistoricism, and insists on contextual, historical analy-
sis of law;
4. challenges the presumptive legitimacy of social institutions;
5. insists on recognition of both the experiential knowledge and
critical consciousness of people of color in understanding law and
society;
6. is interdisciplinary and eclectic (drawing upon, inter alia, liber-
alism, poststructuralist, feminism, Marxism, critical legal theory,
postmodemism, and pragmatism) with the claim that the intersection
of race and the law overruns disciplinary boundaries; and
7. works toward the liberation of people of color as it embraces the
larger project of liberating all oppressed people 131
The purpose of CRT, its raison d'etre, is twofold. First its purpose
is to demonstrate the many ways in which white supremacy is endemic to
American society by "exposing the facets of law and legal discourse that
create racial categories and legitimate racial subordination.' ' 132 Second,
its purpose is to destabilize and change this relationship, in part by chal-
lenging or proposing alternative laws, among other things, in order to
contribute to the liberation of oppressed people. As Jerome Culp notes,
Critical Race Theory may mean many different things to different peo-
ple, but "there is a common belief in an opposition to oppression."'
' 33
And, CRT scholars such as Matsuda and Hutchinson, as well as LatCrit
and others have issued a clarion call that Antisubordination, a stance
against all forms of oppression and subordination, be both the commit-
ment of race scholars and the principle upon which racial justice, particu-
larly equality, be understood and practiced. 1
3 4
These tenets and the overall commitment to antisubordination that
CRT scholars evidence also provide crucial insight into CRT methodo-
logical tendencies. CRT is said to have no single, unifying methodol-
ogy. 35 Rather it is eclectic, drawing from various schools, disciplines
and approaches. 136 Harris, in providing some examples of the different
methodologies employed by Race Crits, notes that they include structur-
131. Phillips, supra note 4, at 1249-50.
132. CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xiii.
133. Jerome McCristal Culp., Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REv.
1637, 1638 (1999).
134. See Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Juris-
prudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1329-1404 (1991), reprinted in part in
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 557-61; see
also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race ": The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 622.
135. See e.g., Harris, supra note 1, at 1218; infra note 146 (Dorothy Brown making a similar
point).
136. Harris, supra note 1, at 1217-18.
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alism and historical, doctrinal (legal), empirical and economic analy-
ses. 137
CRT approaches can, however, be said to possess some unifying
themes or methodological tendencies. These include a particular focus
on context and history. 38  CRT suggests that a rule or principle may
mean different things in different contexts and/or historical periods. So,
for instance, they have argued that the idea of colorblindness, first ex-
pressed in Justice Harlan's 1896 dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, can be
understood at that time as a progressive idea in the context of a society in
which law sanctioned the explicit and systematic oppression of blacks
after slavery. However, a colorblind approach to race in the current era,
when the subordination of blacks is no longer explicit but remains sys-
tematic, is no longer a progressive approach. 39  Thus, as an abstract
principle its meaning and progressive potential is neither universal nor
trans-historical. CRT, therefore, pays particular attention to the specific-
ity of context in order to understand the meanings of a particular concept
or practice, to evaluate a particular position and to render additional in-
formation and ideas.
Further, CRT argues that as rules and principles mean different
things in different contexts that they should mean different things in dif-
ferent contexts. So for instance, equality might mean symmetrical or
"same treatment" in a society without vast racial, gender, and class ine-
qualities but might mean and require affirmative practices to bring about
equality for historically disadvantaged groups, treating them differently
than the privileged, in a society with these alarming disparities. 
140
In addition, CRT scholars listen to and scrutinize the voices, under-
standings and experiences of marginalized and oppressed peoples to situ-
ate, test, and inspire the examination of particular and/or novel ap-
proaches to law. 141 The idea of distinctive minority voices recognizes,
for example, that not every Native American critiques the American
holiday "Columbus Day."'142  But it does understand that, given Native
137. Id. at 1218 n.6.
138. Id. at 1229; see Houh, supra note 43, at 1061-62.
139. But see Gotanda, supra note 2, at 257.
140. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 134, at 646 (discussing equality as not symmetrical).
141. See e.g., Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (urging CLS to draw on the experiences and writings of
marginalized groups to inform their theory).
142. In 1992, the five hundredth anniversary of Columbus' arrival in the Western Hemisphere
was marked by Indian protests across the country. MATTHEW DENNIS, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE
LETTER DAYS: AN AMERICAN CALENDAR 154-55 (2002). Columbus Day had not been officially
celebrated until the tercentenary in 1892, one hundred years earlier, when "some - especially Afri-
can-Americans - began to contest the Columbus celebrations, not so much the accepted view of
Columbus the Man but rather the image of Columbia the land of freedom, opportunity and pro-
gress." Id. at 148. See generally IDA B. WELLS, FREDERICK DOUGLASS, IRVINE GARLAND PENN, &
FERDINAND L. BARNETT, THE REASON WHY THE COLORED AMERICAN Is NOT IN THE WORLD'S
COLUMBIAN ExPOSITION (Robert W. Rydell ed., 1999); Sylvia Wynter, 1492: A New World View,
in RACE, DISCOURSE AND THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAS: A NEW WORLD VIEW 5-57 (Vera Law-
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American history, the conditions of oppression, and the cultural nature of
their resistance, Native Americans might find the idea of Columbus dis-
covering America problematic, and not exactly a cause for celebration. 1
43
This understanding has led CRT scholars to excavate forgotten or over-
looked histories, rules, and cases, as well as the cultural practices, stories,
and perspectives of marginalized groups as sources for grounding their
analysis.
In this vein, race crits have often successfully employed story-
telling or narrative to explore alternative meanings, insights, and per-
spectives on an issue. Some of the leading legal storytellers include Der-
rick Bell (And We Are Not Saved (1989), Faces at the Bottom of the Well
(1993), and Gospel Choirs (1996)), Richard Delgado in his Rodrigo se-
ries (1996) and When Equality Ends (1999), and Patricia Williams in The
Alchemy of Race and Rights (1991). 144 Legal storytelling has garnered
significant critique, including criticisms (1) that such stories are not sub-
ject to empirical or other typical methods of evaluation; (2) that chal-
lenge the idea of a particular minority voice or perspective; and (3) that
charge that such stories tend to distort the "truth,"' 145 a truth understood
by many CRT theorists, as simply the common sense understandings that
arise under the current hegemonic ideologies and practices. It has further
led to the suggestion as Dorothy Brown points out, that CRT stands
against empiricism as a form of argumentation and verification because it
refutes narrative. 146 This idea is buttressed by CRT's embrace of CLS'
rence Hyatt & Rex Nettleford eds., 1995) (for a critique of Columbus and what he stands for from a
modem black perspective).
143. See James Barron, He's the Explorer/Exploiter You Just Have to Love/Hate, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1992, at B1.
144. See generally Bell, supra note 59, at 20-29; Bell, supra note 65; DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL
CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME (1996); RICHARD DELGADO,
THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1996), reprinted in part
in CRT: CUrTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 388-396; RICHARD DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS:
STORIES ABOUT RACE AND RESISTANCE (1999); WILLIAMS, supra note 96; DELGADO & STEFANCIC,
CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 37-49; CRT: CUTrING EDGE, supra note 1, at 41-91;
Margaret E. Montoya, Celebrating Racialized Legal Narratives, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 243-301; Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My
Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders' Chronicle as Racial History, 34
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425 (1990), reprinted in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 9-20; Thomas
Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 381 (1989), reprinted in CRT: CUTrING EDGE,
supra note 1, at 42-51; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994);
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990), reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note
1, at 565-81; Rachel F. Moran, Full Circle, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, at 113-17;
CARL GUTIERREZ-JONES, CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES: A STUDY OF RACE, RHETORIC, AND INJURY
(2001).
145. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). But see Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL.
L. REv. 255 (1994); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry,
46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993).
146. Dorothy A. Brown, in the Symposium, Critical Race Theory: The Next Frontier: Fight-
ing Racism in the Twenty-First Century, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1485 (2004), suggested that CRT
rejects numbers as neutral, that the privileging of numbers refutes narrative, and thus empirical
research may be incompatible with CRT. Id. at 1486-87. But she argued that empirical evidence is
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critique of the Law and Economics movement, 147 a scholarly tendency
that often employs empirical data. While most law is viewed from the
liberal perspective of individual rights perceived as neutral and objective,
the Law and Economics School, like CLS, is critical of that approach.
Law and Economics, however, is a conservative approach, which accord-
ing to crits, simply replaces law's claims of impartially and neutrality
with similar claims for the field of economics. 148  Economics, however,
is neither neutral nor objective. Rather, it too involves political choices
both at the level of practice and study. And, arguably, both are replete
with the values, assumptions, presumptions and dictates about human
behavior and the operation of society as determined and understood by
the current economic order of capitalism. 1
49
Harris, however, notes that CRT scholars have employed both em-
pirical data and economic analysis. 150  Nevertheless, an argument based
on empiricism or economic analysis, according to CRT, is just that, a
form of argumentation in which political choices are made as to what
should be included or excluded and what is important or not, as well as
how the facts or statistics should be interpreted. Similar empirical data
could presumably be used, like various rules, to support contrary and
alternative arguments and interpretations. 1
51
necessary to reach out to white America. Id. at 1489. Darren Hutchinson argues that CRT theorists
usually rely on law and legal reasoning, but could buttress their arguments by also relying on politi-
cal science data that, for instance, have used polling to demonstrate that the Supreme Court largely
responds to majoritarian concerns in its decision-making and facilitates majoritarian interests. Dar-
ren Lenard Hutchinson, Critical Race Theory: History, Evolution, and New Frontiers: Critical Race
Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187, 1213-14 (2004). That was also a common theme in
the public law subfield of political science. See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1994); MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT:
NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1964); 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION (Rich-
ard Loss ed., 1981); 2 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION (Richard Loss ed., 1987); 3 CORWIN ON THE
CONSTITUTION (Richard Loss ed., 1988); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Role of the Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
147. See generally RICHARD I. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS (2005); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2002); GORDON TULLOCK, LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005).
148. Mark G. Kelman, Critical Legal Studies Symposium: Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293,
294 (1984); Mark G. Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of
"Law and Economics, " 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 274, 274 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 387 (1981); Duncan Kennedy &
Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711,713 (1980).
149. James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV.
161,176 (1986).
150. Harris, supra note 1, at 1218 n.6. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law
and Economics of Critical Race Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1757 (2003) (book review), reprinted in part in A WOMAN'S PLACE, supra note
43, at 140-53; Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 N. ENG. L.
REV. 913, 914 (1994) (critiquing Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the
Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978)); William Bratton, Anti-Subordination and the Legal
Struggle Over the "Means of Communication ": Law and Economics of English Only, 53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 973, 973-74 (1999).
151. See supra note 148; see also Harris, supra note 25, at 907-14 (reviewing the empirical
study undertaken in the book Whitewashing Race, see BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE, supra
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Finally, the tendency of CRT to deconstruct and expose the racial
meanings of law betrays its post-modem sensibilities and contradicts its
commitment to modernist ideals of justice, truth, and dignity 5 2 (because
as race crits and other post-modem scholars might argue a principle in
one context may mean something radically different in another). How-
ever, in view of the dual vision that W.E.B. Du Bois located in the op-
pressed, and the dual respect and disdain that oppressed people have
shown for the law, 153 scholars have encouraged race crits to inhabit the
tension between its post-modem insights and its modernist ideals of jus-
tice because within that tension lie CRT's creative potential. 154
V. LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
Below I provide a brief structural history of the relationship be-
tween race and law focusing primarily on case law, and drawing on and
applying some of the insights and methodological tendencies of Critical
Race Theory. Specifically, I employ historical analysis and narrative to
tell the story of this relationship between law and race. The narrative
emphasizes the longevity of American racial ordering and practice, the
breadth of that racial ordering, and its depth in regulating American life.
It does so to demonstrate the ways in which law both constructs and pro-
duces races and racism and the deeply structured nature of race in U.S.
society. Further, it is meant to show, focusing on the United States Su-
preme Court, how the law's increasing reliance on colorblind individual-
ism works to maintain, rather than undermine the racial caste system
created over several hundred years. 155 In doing so, it provides a counter-
narrative to the dominant and ever popular story about race and law that
note 25, and arguing that although the study thoroughly contested the colorblind conception of
racism as the function of individual bigoted action, empirical evidence alone is insufficient to dis-
lodge the theory). Harris, examining the various interpretations of whether race played a role in
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, explains that empirical evidence was not enough, in part, because
colorblindness is a well-funded ideology promoted over the last several decades; but primarily
because "the ability to process empirical facts into a different understanding [is] ... compromised by
the divergent . . . perspectives through which the facts are viewed." See Harris, supra note 25, at
913. She argues that there are frames or frameworks, in this case racial frames, which allow us to
make sense of facts; they are "what lies between the facts and our perceptions - the mediating struc-
tures that allow us to make sense of the world." Id. at 914. Regarding Katrina she ventures:
... while people of all races agree that Katrina exposed the social costs of poverty, most
Whites consider race largely irrelevant in explaining what happened (or did not happen)
while Blacks tend to view race as a crucial part of the story. In the aftermath of Katrina,
the question that is being debated is less a matter of what happened - what is at issue is
why - and here the absence of a consensus demonstrates how racial divisions in the inter-
pretation of seemingly uncontested facts can result in entirely divergent assessments of
causation. The facts in this case did not seem to lead to a new racial paradigm; indeed,
initial differences in the perceptions of the salience of race seemed to persist, notwith-
standing relative agreement on the facts.
id. at 913.
152. See generally Harris, supra note 42, at 743.
153. WILLIAMS, supra note 96, at 35-36; see DU BOIS, supra note 130, at 3.
154. Harris, supra note 42, at 760, 778 (suggesting that in inhabiting this tension, CRT race-
crits aspire to and attempt to make real the dreams that modernity promised).
155. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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suggests that the struggle for racial justice, though long and incremental,
is nevertheless forward-moving, progressive, and eventually triumphant,
given the American creed and precepts. 156 Instead it suggests the stagna-
tion of racial progress because of the continuity of the underlying struc-
tures of white supremacist thought, operation, and social arrangements,
though accomplished through new and changing forces and rationaliza-
tions.
A. Early Construction of Race by Law
Throughout most of American history, legislators, legal practitio-
ners, and judges have made and interpreted various legal doctrines, rules,
and procedures to define, construct, produce, and preserve white privi-
lege and black subordination, as well as the subordination of other people
of color. Throughout most of its history, American law has been decid-
edly race conscious and specifically white supremacist whenever it has
encountered what it, itself, has often defined as Other.
For instance, in order to perpetuate a white state, judges defined
whiteness through case law to determine whether a Japanese man was
white for purposes of citizenship, whether a Chinese person was black or
Indian for the purpose of determining whether he could testify against a
white, and whether Mexicans were white and thus entitled to serve on
juries. 157 American law facilitated, defined, and established white privi-
leges by limiting the rights of Indians to their land and facilitating white
appropriation of the same land. 158  It did so using slave laws, black
codes, and Jim Crow laws to exploit Black labor and maintain Black
subordination for the purposes of white wealth accumulation and white
racial class consolidation. 5 9 It has constructed race for the purposes of
determining who might vote, the manner in which those who presumably
were entitled to vote could do so, and whether such people could actually
and effectively vote. 160 It delineated a range of businesses practices af-
156. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1; BELL, supra note 2,
at 22.
157. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477, 482 (1954); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S.
178 (1922); People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 399 (Cal. 1854); see also Neil Gotanda, Comparative Ra-
cialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1695 (2000)
(comparing People v. Hall and the Dred Scott case); Miguel A. Mdndez, Hernandez: The Wrong
Message at the Wrong Time, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 193 (1993), reprinted in part in THE
LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 1, at 602-04.
158. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587-88 (1823); see also Eric Kades, History and Inter-
pretation of the Great Case ofJohnson v. M'lntosh, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 67,67 (2001).
159. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559-60 (1896); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-06
(1857).
160. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. ART. 3107 (Vernon 1925). In "1924, the Texas statute, Art.
3093a, afterwards numbered Art. 3107 (Rev. Stat. 1925) declared 'in no event shall a Negro be
eligible to participate in a Democratic Party primary election in the State of Texas.'" Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 658 (1944) (citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)). In Breedlove v.
Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 280-281 (1937), the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia provision requiring
payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting. Though a white man brought the case, the estab-
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fecting everyone from laborers to professionals including who could be
treated by a doctor or a nurse. It has used racial categories to the detri-
ment of people of color to determine questions concerning where people
can live, 16 1 who they can marry, 162 what schools they can attend, 163 and
where they sit on a train, and in a cafeteria, or theater. 164
From a CRT perspective, the movement from overt racial oppres-
sion sanctioned by law to law's racial neutrality or colorblindness has
done little to undo the systemic and accumulated conditions of racial
oppression created by and through law over several hundred years. For
that matter, except for two very brief though significant periods, Ameri-
can law has been and remains a bulwark of white supremacy. The prom-
ulgation of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the ratification of the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, 165 should have disrupted
lishment of poll taxes was one of the many ways in which blacks were prohibited from voting.
Breedlove was overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
161. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946) (upholding restrictive covenants in
housing). Kraemer was overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 23 (1948). See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 33-34 (1948) (companion case invalidating
racially restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia-to which the fourteenth amendment did
not apply-by applying the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 258 (1953)
(damages not awardable for breach of a racially restrictive housing covenant). But see BELL, supra
note 2, at 294-96 (describing subsequent history and current problems of housing discrimination).
See generally CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959). Three Justices did not participate in Shelley and Hurd,
reportedly because they owned property subject to racially restrictive covenants. C. HERMAN
PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 142 (1954). For other discussions of housing
segregation, see Calmore, supra note 41; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); DAVID DELANEY,
RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836-1948 (1998).
162. Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (1954). Bell notes that "[a]ccording to one study, 38
states had miscegenation statutes at one time or another during the nineteenth century, and as late as
1951, 29 statutes were still on the books." BELL, supra note 2, at 256. The United States Supreme
Court struck down these laws in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See RACHEL F. MORAN,
INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 6 (2001).
163. Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), rev'd, 339 U.S. 629, 635-
636 (1950) (ruling that a black student could attend a white university). However, while the Court
granted relief in this case it did not address the constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine.
Rather this doctrine was finally overturned in Brown.
164. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545, 548 (1896).
165. U.S. CONST., amend. XIII-XV. It should be noted that between 1777 and 1817, slavery
had been abolished in the Northem states by, variously, constitutional provisions, constitutional
interpretation, judicial decisions, and most often by gradual emancipation statutes. See LEON F.
LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 3-20 (1961); BELL,
supra note 2, at 22-23; ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 169-89 (1967). Slavery had already been abolished by judicial decision in
England-but not in its colonies-in 1772. Somersett v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772); see
also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 313 (1978). The American national government, however, pro-
tected slavery through the fugitive slave clauses of the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest
Ordinance, and the U.S. Constitution, among other provisions, although these instruments studiously
avoided using the word. Articles of Confederation, art. 6 (1781); Northwest Ordinance, art. 6
(1787); U.S. CONST., art. IV, §2, cl. 3. Other provisions of the original Constitution implicitly
upheld slavery. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (slaves counted as three-fifths the number of free
persons for purposes of apportionment of representation in the House of Representatives); U.S.
CONST., art. 1, § 9, cl. 1 (no Congressional prohibition of the importation of slaves before 1808).
Generally, courts enforced the fugitive slave clause despite its increasing unpopularity in the North.
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the legal construction of white racial supremacy and nonwhite racial
subordination, but ultimately failed to do so. Nonetheless, wrenched
from a civil war, these laws helped radically change the status of most
blacks from slaves to free people and might have held the promise of
providing the economic, social, and political rewards of citizenship and
belonging. 166 But the promise of Reconstruction was short-lived, as the
nation's political leadership capitulated to the southern elites' efforts to
reassert white control over black life. 167 Various legal actors including
judges, enacted laws and interpreted legal doctrine, to narrow the re-
wards of citizenship based on race helping to legitimate the Jim Crow era
of racial segregation. Significant among these developments was the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Plessy permitting the segregation and subordi-
nation of black people.
The legal strategies of the NAACP and others beginning in the
1920's 168 and culminating in decisions such as Hernandez and Brown,
helped to spark the civil rights movement, renewing the promise of
equality in the 1960's. It was successful to the extent that it unraveled
the explicit manifestations of racial ordering. 169 Crucial to this limited
success was the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of equal protection as
sanctioning the use of racial measures, such as affirmative action and
school desegregation to potentially undo the racialized social and institu-
tional patterns of oppression. 
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See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175-89
(1975).
166. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 36-39 (1960);
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 12 (1965); RECONSTRUCTION:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS 473-531 (Kenneth M. Stampp & Leon F. Lutwack eds.,
1969); WILLIAM BROCK, CONFLICT AND TRANSFORMATION: THE UNITED STATES, 1844-1877 360-
61 (1973); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 77-
79 (1988); DAVID HERBERT DONALD, JEAN H. BAKER & MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 536 (2001).
167. WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869-1879 3-7 (1979); C. VANN
WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF
RECONSTRUCTION 3-4, 246 (1951); RECONSTRUCTION: AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS,
supra note 166, at 473-53 1. Whatever the reasons for the judiciary's rapid retreat from enforcing the
constitutional and statutory law of Reconstruction, they did not include any overall aversion to so-
called judicial activism. In this period, the courts regained the prestige and increased the power they
enjoyed before the Dred Scott case. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 31-35 (1968); William F. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judi-
cial Power, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969), reprinted in part in AMERICAN LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 237-45. (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988).
168. KLUGER, supra note 34, at 100-750; MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 xi (1987).
169. Robert Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 247 (1968)
(Carter, a veteran NAACP litigator stated "[F]ew in the country, black or white, understood in 1954
that racial segregation was merely the symptom, not the disease; that the real sickness is that our
society in all its manifestations is geared to the maintenance of white superiority").
170. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (1955).
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The highlights of this period were the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of
1968, and the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.17' The latter case
involved hiring practices, based on standards not related to job perform-
ance, which had the effect of disqualifying disproportionate numbers of
blacks relative to whites. In Griggs, the Supreme Court took an ap-
proach to race (not the colorblind approach) that might have engendered
actions that would result in actual changes in the conditions of black
lives in terms of poverty, wealth accumulation, health, etc. This was so
because it potentially rendered successful, suits brought on evidence of
racial disparities and the impact of laws (demonstrated largely through
statistical evidence of continuing disparities), instead of on proof of some
individual's intention to discriminate. 
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B. Colorblindness in Law Blocking Racial Progress
However, just as during and after Reconstruction, 173 courts began to
narrow these laws, thereby stabilizing and legitimizing the prevailing
order of white privilege and nonwhite disadvantage. So for example,
though the desegregation (integration) of secondary schools in the United
States had only begun in earnest in 1964 due to the Court's initial hesi-
tancy and massive white resistance; 7 4 the Court had already signaled its
retreat from desegregation by 1973 by allowing a school board to poten-
171. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000a (2006); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C.S. § 1971 (2006); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.S. § 3601 (2006); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971) (construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
172. Cf McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329-330 (1987) (involving the Georgia sentencing
system, which does not mention race (race-neutral) but has a disparate and disadvantaging impact on
blacks). Georgia's capital sentencing system had been invalidated three times and Georgia had a
long history of a "dual system." In the case, McCleskey, a black man, was sentenced to death for
murdering a white police officer. Id. at 283. He challenged the death sentence in his case based on a
sophisticated statistical study, finding that prosecutors in Georgia sought the death penalty in seventy
percent of cases involving a black defendant and white victim, compared to only thirty-two percent
of the time where both defendant and victim were white. Id. at 286-87. It also showed that the death
penalty was assessed in twenty-two percent of cases involving black defendants and white victims,
as compared to only 8 percent in cases involving both whites. Id. at 286. The Court rejected the use
of the statistical reports to document discriminatory effect in the absence of proof of intentional
discrimination. Id. at 297-99. The Court nevertheless stresses its "unceasing" efforts to overcome
racism in the criminal justice system, id. at 309, but undercut this assertion near the outset of the
case by limiting the examination to one of "purposeful discrimination." Id. 292. Thus, the Court's
unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice in the criminal justice system stopped at the door of
proof of intent against and in an individual defendant's case without an examination of the systemic
context in which the case was decided. See Hernandez, supra note 2, at 141-43 (discussing this
case).
173. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-26 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. 36, 77-79 (1873).
174. See, e.g., OLGETREE, supra note 34, at 10 (discussing the Court's "deliberate speed"); see
also BROWN, supra note 30, at 167-74 (discussing the massive white resistance to Brown ranging
from protest, and violence against black students attempting to attend white schools to white offi-
cials entirely eliminating public schools while publicly funding white children's private school
attendance and including rapid and substantial movement of white families to the suburban areas in
order to avoid sending their children to schools where the possibility of integration with blacks was
slimmer).
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tially escape the imposition of desegregation (integration) orders if it
could show that segregation had occurred in the district owing to acts
other than the board's intentional activities. 75  The Court held this de-
spite the fact that the de facto practice of racial segregation in society
was nearly universal.
In Milliken v. Bradley,176 decided a year later, the Court dealt the
"deathblow to the [nation's] ability to successfully integrate public
schools."' 177 It effectively made U.S. suburbs safe havens for whites who
did not want their children to attend integrated schools with black chil-
dren, and in doing so, the Court contributed to "white flight" to those
suburbs. 178 Further, that blacks and other minorities would have to prove
that some individual or institution had engaged in individual and identifi-
able discriminatory acts in order for the Courts to redress their griev-
ances or remedy discrimination, was later confirmed in Washington v.
Davis,179 despite the pervasive and systemic presence of racism, racial
segregation, and racial discrimination in the country.
180
The Supreme Court, however, narrowed the laws, not only by fo-
cusing primarily on intentional, identifiable acts of discrimination, but
also by focusing on the individual and by virtually banning the use of
racial categories-arguably long before affirmative uses of these catego-
ries could affect any significant change in the social arrangements and
structure of white racial power. In focusing on the individual, the courts
175. BROWN, supra note 30, at 208-10 (discussing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo.,
413 U.S. 189 (1973)). In Keyes, the plaintiffs proved the Denver county school board had operated
to deliberately segregate schools in a core section of the city district in which over one-third of the
black children attended, but the Court held the school board could rebut the presumption of system-
wide segregation by proving that they had not intentionally segregated the schools system-wide.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 252-53.
176. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken was one of the first desegregation cases to be pursued in
the North, where there had been few laws requiring segregation, but de facto segregation was preva-
lent. The plaintiffs sought a remedy for the segregation of Detroit schools, which would involve the
adjoining, predominantly white suburban school districts. Id. The trial court had held that the State
of Michigan was responsible for designing the school district system in which the city of Detroit was
effectively racially segregated. Id. The Supreme Court held that, absent a showing that a constitu-
tional violation in one district produced a significant desegregation effect in another, there could be
no "cross-district remed[ies]." Id. at 744; see BROWN, supra note 30, at 213. According to Kevin
Brown, the effect of the decision was that the suburbs were deemed safe havens by whites who could
afford to move and who wanted to avoid integration. BROWN, supra note 30, at 210. Although the
Keyes and Milliken cases represented the Court's initial retreat from school desegregation, Brown
argues that the primary reason for the complete abandonment of desegregation throughout the
1980's and 1990's was the result of the application of the ideology of colorblind individualism to
school desegregation cases.
177. BROWN, supra note 30, at 210-11.
178. BROWN, supra note 30, at 211.
179. 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
180. Justice Thurgood Marshall-the first black U.S. Supreme Court Justice and the attorney
that had argued Brown before the Court-responded to a similar idea in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke: "It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes demon-
strate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so
pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact." 438 U.S.
265,400 (1978).
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were able to ignore or trivialize societal-wide racial ordering that bur-
dened minorities as a group and individuals based on group membership,
and pretend that racism was an unfortunate feature of the past only cur-
rently existing in the aberrant individual. 181 In taking a colorblind ap-
proach, the Court prohibited almost all uses of racial categories regard-
less of whether they were being used to subordinate blacks and other
non-whites ("invidious discrimination") or to redress systemic white
racial oppression of and on behalf of blacks and other nonwhites ("be-
nign discrimination"). In essence, the Court increasingly applied the
approach of colorblind individualism. 182 And, because Brown and its
progeny had largely eliminated explicit racial subordinating laws, the
focus and targets of this colorblind approach became the remedies and
measures meant to address racial oppression (measures opposed mostly
by whites as reverse discrimination), even as minorities have sought to
expand these.
The Supreme Court has not, in so many words, declared colorblind-
ness to be the new interpretation of equal protection, but rather it has
largely accomplished it through various procedural and other standards
drawing on its logic. 183 These include not only limiting remedies to in-
tentional conduct, but also applying the Court's highest and toughest
level of review, strict scrutiny now to all cases involving racial classifica-
tions, even if they are employed remedially to redress the consequences
of earlier intentional discrimination. The Court's rationale is that "any
official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or
ethnic origin is inherently suspect," and that "[d]istinctions between citi-
zens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a
free people." 184  The Court is motivated by a number of concerns, but
seems particularly concerned about protecting "innocent people,'' 85 a
phrase used generally to refer to white people. 1
86
181. See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)); see also, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION,
supra note 1, at 7.
182. See BROWN, supra note 30.
183. Prior to 1995, the Supreme Court had been divided as to whether strict scrutiny should
apply to all cases involving racial classifications. Strict scrutiny had been applied to "invidious"
discrimination cases where discrimination built over centuries of practice was meant to disadvantage
minorities. The Court, however, had applied a more lenient level of scrutiny to remedies that relied
on race to benefit minorities and undo the past discrimination. This had been termed by the Court
"benign" discrimination. However, in 1995 a solid majority of the Court held in favor of applying
strict scrutiny to all uses of race-specific laws. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 222 (1995).
184. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-25 (internal citations omitted). Strict scrutiny requires that the
use of a racial classification be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.
185. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 (using the phrase "innocent
persons" meaning innocent third parties).
186. See BELL, supra note 2, at 123; Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, Un-Natural
Things: Constructions of Race, Gender, and Disability, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 180; Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43
VAND. L. REv. 297, 297-301 (1990), reprinted in CRT: CUTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 635-47;
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But the Court has also expressed a concern for protecting subordi-
nated racial groups from stereotypical stigmas associated with remedies
such as affirmative action, claiming "it may not always be clear that a so-
called preference is in fact benign." 187 The effect of the requirement to
prove intent and the application of strict scrutiny in the context of equal
protection defined as individual as opposed to group protection and in-
creasingly influenced by colorblind ideology are many. They include,
the Court: (1) treating racial classifications as if they are the source of
racial oppression as opposed to the systemic racial ordering in the human
and institutional decision-making and operation of white power in the
United States; (2) treating claims of white people to maintain the un-
earned privileges bestowed by the racial caste system as if they were the
same as nonwhite claims to change and make the social system more
fair; (3) ignoring societal wide racial ordering and the racial caste system
by isolating and remedying only those practices that can be specifically
identified and proven as the products of intentional actions; and (4) thus
severely limiting anti-discrimination or anti-oppression measures, either
forward-looking or past-correcting, thereby preserving the status quo of
racial inequality.
For example, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
188
a suit bought by a white applicant denied admission to a medical school,
the Supreme Court struck down an admissions program that reserved a
number of seats for minority students in the entering class. 189 The Court
noted, "the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color."' 190 According to Justice Powell's majority opinion, then,
strict scrutiny-which had hitherto been applied primarily in cases where
the government had used racial identification to disadvantage minori-
ties-should apply to any racial classification for any purpose. The
Court thus struck down a program meant to undo the racial ordering of
white privilege and nonwhite subordination, arguing that equality pro-
tected the individual regardless of his "race," or should be blind to "race"
(biology), despite the socially-constructed meaning, both material and
expressive, of race in America that rendered admissions into the medical
school predominantly white in the first place. 191 In addition, Justice
Powell expressed concern for "innocent [white] persons," noting that it
was impermissible for them to be forced "to bear the burdens of redress-
ing grievances not of their making,"' 192 but seemed blind to the fact that
that his decision left blacks bearing the burdens of exclusion, subordina-
tion and discrimination not of their own making.
187. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
188. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
189. Id. at 289-90.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (on the meaning of race).
192. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
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Further in 1986, the Court struck down provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement that in response to past integration litigation pro-
vided black teachers greater protection against layoffs than it provided to
white teaches with higher levels of seniority. 193 In absence of the agree-
ment, an agreement, again, meant to undo the racial ordering of white
privilege and nonwhite subordination, black teachers would have been
the first fired because they were the last hired, their hiring presumably
occasioned in the first place by affirmative action measures. 194 Brought
by white teachers seeking to protect their positions through the seniority
plan, the Court, referring to whites, noted that the level of scrutiny did
not alter "because the challenged classification operates against a group
that historically had not been subject to governmental discrimination."'1 95
Commenting on societal-wide racial discrimination as a basis for uphold-
ing the agreement, the Court notes:
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy .... No one doubts that there
has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the ba-
sis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against in-
nocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over-
expansive. 196
Apparently it was acceptable for blacks and other nonwhites to suffer the
cost of societal discrimination operating to the benefit of whites, but in-
appropriate and over-expansive for whites to bear any costs in eliminat-
ing this same societal discrimination that primarily and inappropriately
privileged them.
And in 1989, the Court struck down a plan by the city of Richmond
requiring those who received city contracts to subcontract thirty percent
of the contract's value to businesses owned by minorities.' 197 The city
enacted the plan to remedy past discrimination in the construction indus-
try based on a number of factors including, (1) testimony about racial
discrimination in the industry, (2) the fact that, although black residents
constituted almost fifty percent of the city, they received less than one
percent of public contracting funds; (3) that there were almost no minor-
ity contractors in local and state contractors' associations; and (4) that
"in 1977, Congress [had] made a determination that the effects of past
discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction in-
dustry nationally."' 198 The Court explained that these facts did not "pro-
vide the city of Richmond with a 'strong basis in evidence for its conclu-
193. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273; see also Ross, supra note 186, at 638 (discussing this case).
194. Ross, supra note 186, at 638.
195. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
196. Id. at 276 (emphasis omitted).
197. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477, 498 (1989) (plurality opinion).
198. Id. at 499 (plurality opinion).
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sion that remedial action was necessary."' 1 99 The Court reasoned that
the wrong was so "ill-defined" that "relief'-apparently incredulously
and impermissibly-"could extend until the percentage of public con-
tracts awarded to [minority-controlled businesses] in Richmond mirrored
the percentage of minorities in the population as a whole., 20 0  And al-
though the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger,20 1 ultimately allowed
applicants' "race" to be considered in the limited area of admissions in
higher educational institutions in a case involving a white student denied
law school admission; 20 2 it did so on a theory of diversity that abstracted
and disconnected the meaning of diversity from exclusionary practices
and racial/social justice concerns.20 3
However, it is in the complicated area of voting where the color-
blind ideology seems to have received its greatest boost. Here, despite
the fact that the 15th Amendment was initially enacted to provide the
newly emerging slaves a right to vote and there has been and continues
to be a long and appalling struggle to ensure meaningful enfranchise-
ment, 2°4 the Court, according to Bell, has established a new constitu-
199. Id. at 500 (plurality opinion) (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion)).
200. Id. at 498 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor also seemed concerned by the fact, in a
section of the opinion lacking a majority, that Richmond was 50 percent black and five of the nine
council officials that passed the ordinance were black. She suggested that this presented a stronger
need for the application of strict scrutiny since it was not a majority of whites acting in a way that
burdened themselves but was the act of minorities doing so. Id. at 495-96 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
"Many commentators, the Court dissenters included, were astonished by the Croson decision."
BELL, supra note 2, at 666; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Patricia
Williams, Legal Storytelling. The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 at 2129-30 (1989); Ross, supra note 144, at 381.
201. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
202. The decision came on the heels of lower court decisions and statutes applying colorblind
approaches to similar affirmative action cases. The effects of these laws were that fewer black and
brown students gained admission into these institutions, leaving them overwhelmingly white. See,
e.g., California Proposition 209, supra note 77; Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
These events revealed not only the social embeddedness of white supremacist racial ordering but
demonstrated the way in which colorblindness policies were a proxy for and a mechanism for main-
taining white access and privilege.
203. Who Gets In: A Quest for Diversity after Grutter - The 2004 James McCormick Mitchell
Lecture, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 531, 579, 584 (2004) (transcript of discussion by Frank Wu and Charles
Daye). Other panelists included Athena Mutua, Shedon Zedeck, Margaret Montoya and David
Chambers. Law school admissions continue to be a focus of CRT attention. See, e.g., Dorothy A.
Brown, Taking Grutter Seriously. Getting Beyond the Numbers, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006); Kevin
R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of "A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools," 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1, 1-5 (2005). The
decision was then justified in part on proclaiming the benefits of diversity as teaching presumably
white students that "there is no minority viewpoint," and "visibly" lending legitimacy to the system
by signifying that the "path to leadership [is] ... open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320, 332 (internal citations omitted).
204. This struggle of course continues up until this very day. Consider the efforts to disenfran-
chise minorities in Florida during the 2000 Presidential election and again in Ohio in the 2004 elec-
tion. For discussions of these events, see, e.g., Calmore, supra note 30, at 1267-71; Hugh M. Lee,
An Analysis of State and Federal Remedies for Election Fraud, Learning from Florida's Presidential
Election Debacle, 63 U. PITr. L. REV. 159, 159-160 (2001); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, DRAFT REPORT: VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION (approved by the Commissioners on June 8, 2001), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/main.htm; Monique L. Dixon, Constructive Disenfran-
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tional injury. First articulated in the case of Shaw v. Reno,20 5 the injury
seems to be that of a state by "a predominant use of race in redistricting"
impermissibly sending the message "that racial identity is and should be
an American citizen's most salient political characteristic., 20 6 The point
is that redistricting should be race-blind.2 °7 Unsurprisingly, the case
involved blocked efforts to create a voting district that would render
black votes meaningful, while ignoring the pervasive historical and cur-
rent realities of racial bloc voting by whites who often have been reluc-
tant to elect black representatives or elect whites who will effectively
represent black or other nonwhite interests and ignoring the racialized
politics and gerrymandering of white politicians.20 8 The ultimate effect
of these interpretations is that law, while denying blacks and other non-
chisement: The Problems of Access & Ambiguity Facing the American Voter: Minority Disenfran-
chisement During the 2000 General Election: A Blast from the Past or a Blueprint for Reform, 11
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 311, 311-313 (2002). On felony disenfranchisement, one of the
major forms of minority disenfranchisement used in Florida, see, e.g., Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Note,
Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109,
109-14 (2003); Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345-46 (2003); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution,
Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1147-50
(2004); Marc Mauer, Disenfranchisement of Felons: The Modern-Day Voting Rights Challenge,
CIVIL RIGHTS JOURNAL, Winter 2002, at 40; J. Whyatt Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The
Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 435, 435-36 (2001); Elena Saxonhouse,
Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felon's Challenges to Disenfranchisement and
Employment Discrimination, 56 STAN L. REV. 1597, 1598-1601 (2004); Christopher Uggen & Jeff
Manza, Disenfranchisement and the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons, in CIVIL PENALTIES,
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 67, 68-72 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005); Note, One
Person, No Vote: The Law of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1939-42 (2002).
For a discussion specifically on the 2004 election, see, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of
Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 937, 938-39 (2005) (discussing problems with the 2004 presidential election); Daniel P.
Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help America
Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1220-39 (2005) (discussing problems with the 2004 presi-
dential election in Ohio).
205. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
206. BELL, supra note 2, at 516.
207. Id. (explaining that the new objective of the Court was to enforce a color-blind approach);
see also Calmore, supra note 30, at 1271-74 (arguing that the Supreme Court is undermining the
Voting Rights Act through an imposition of colorblind injustice and commenting that "[w]hile the
Supreme Court majority opinions are death to black race consciousness, they are amazingly naive or
intellectually dishonest when it comes to appreciating that whiteness is also deployed in bloc voting
ways"). Calmore goes on to argue that:
The race opinions of a five-to-four majority on the Supreme Court achieve a false coher-
ence through an incredible process of decontextualization. As a consequence of this radi-
cal decontextualization, the Supreme Court majority appears literally blinded by color as
it - the same five characters each time - neither acknowledges nor recognizes the degree
of racially polarized white bloc voting and therefore will not permit black bloc voting in
what really amounts to self defense. The Court acts as if black bloc voting is the first
move rather than the second, the initial fire rather than the return fire. Through this mis-
recognition of whiteness, the Court majority subjects this second move to strict scrutiny
as it claims to be unable to distinguish invidious from benign racial discrimination. The
second move, blacks taking race predominantly into account, violates the equal protec-
tion rights of whites, because they are deemed to suffer individual 'expressive harm.' In-
dividual rights trump efforts to redress vote dilution, a group harm.
Id. at 1273 (internal citations omitted).
208. See also BELL, supra note 2, at 489-527 (tracing the cases and various obstacles to mean-
ingful enfranchisement for blacks).
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whites justice, has protected vested white interests accumulated over
time, such as seniority systems, educational advancement, wealth, and/or
or white expectations, through the racialized orderings of the society,
first on a theory of white superiority and increasingly on the theory of
colorblindness.
Until the job of racial justice is done, CRT theorists might argue,
CRT will expose the whiteness of colorblindness, the white supremacist
effects of colorblind laws and rulings, and the white consciousness of
American society and power. And CRT theorists will do so, from inside
the experiences, consciousness, and perspectives of Black, Native
American, Latina/o, and Asian American people, etc., using these essen-
tialized categories that white power created to oppress, strategically as
sources of solidarity, empowerment, and analysis.
VI. CRT-RELATED SCHOLARSHIP, THE LATCRIT EXAMPLE: DEEPENING
AND BROADENING THE CRT PROJECT?
The development and proliferation of other scholarship and alterna-
tive institutions such as LatCrit, Asian American legal scholarship, and
critical race feminism, and the writings of sexual minorities of color to
explore race, law, and other systems of oppression has raised concerns
about the fragmentation of the Critical Race Theory (CRT) project. The
development of this CRT-related scholarship, and for instance the sepa-
rate institutionalization of the LatCrit project, also raised concerns over
the multiplication of identity-based groups and thus the elevation of iden-
tity politics as opposed to the formation of a broad political movement, a
criticism widely made in reference to identity politics. 20 9  However,
though a broad political movement has yet to emerge, this "fragmenta-
tion" has actually deepened and broadened the Critical Race Theory pro-
ject by providing the necessary intellectual expansion and theoretical
bridges between identity politics and a politics of solidarity based on
difference.210 So, for instance, these bodies of scholarship broadened the
racial lens through which the workings of white racial privilege were
revealed, such as through Asian American legal scholarship's explora-
tion of Asian-American experiences, and deepened the commitment to
the project of antisubordination by focusing on other systems of social
subordination, such as the patriarchal gendered oppression of women
explored in the context of critical race feminism, as discussed earlier.
However, in addition, they spurred the development of other theories
209. See, e.g., discussion supra note 118; Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 17 at 127-28;
Bryant, supra note 7.
210. A politics of solidarity based on difference stresses common projects and commitments
and embraces difference and diversity. But it rejects assimilation of one group into another as a
prerequisite to or on basis of that solidarity. It also rejects the universalization of one group's ex-
perience. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 157-158 (1990);
NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST"
CONDITION 197-205 (1997) (examining and critiquing this idea).
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through which to analyze the systems of subordination and developed
concepts that emphasized coalition and praxis. Multidimensionality is
one such emerging theory which is based on the insights of antiessential-
ism and intersectionality, insights foundational to the formation of re-
lated scholarship communities; while the concept of antisubordination
praxis has stressed coalition building in addition to and through theory-
informed practice and practice-informed theory. And finally, LatCrit, in
particular, in institutionalizing the LatCrit conference also institutional-
ized the practice of continuing to develop critical theory, building coali-
tions, and engaging practice.
A. Antiessentialism and Intersectionality: Informing Formation, Leading
to Multidimensionality
The depth of LatCrit institutionalization and the conscious theoriz-
ing around this institutionalization and development is unique among
much of the CRT-related scholarship, and I focus on LatCrit for this rea-
son.211  But several of the themes I discuss here as basic to LatCrit the-
ory have been built upon, shared and/or mutually developed by the work
of scholars who identify as CRT scholars or with one or another related
body of work.
People such as Robert Chang, Jerome Culp, Angela Harris, Berta
Hemindez-Truyol, and particularly Frank Valdes and later Elisabeth
Iglesias,21 2 among others, were the spirit behind the establishment and/or
blossoming of LatCrit. They saw LatCrit as a first cousin of CRT and
were committed to building on its strengths and avoiding its mistakes.213
The first mistake they sought to avoid was the perceived elitism and ex-
clusivity of CRT, while nonetheless focusing on issues germane to the
Latina/o community and Latina/o identity (a focus that could be per-
ceived as exclusive). 214 The latter was a challenge, in part because
Latina/o identity as a practical matter seemed to embrace people repre-
senting a host of different nationalities with different cultural perspec-
211. LatCrit also is now an incorporated non-profit organization. While not heavily institu-
tionalized, there are at least two journals committed to the promotion of Asian American legal schol-
arship focusing primarily on Asian Pacific American communities. These are the Asian Law Journal
at University of California Boalt Hall School of Law and the Asian Pacific American Law Journal at
University of California Law School. Adrien Wing has done the most work in theorizing and pull-
ing together materials that represent critical race feminist insights by publishing two readers, one on
Critical Race Feminism, see CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, and another on Global Criti-
cal Race Feminism, see GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 44.
212. I believe few people would argue with my characterizing Francisco "Frank" Valdes as the
father of LatCrit. However, for many of us, Elizabeth "Lisa" Iglesias is the mother of LatCrit. From
what I can figure out Lisa became a central part of LatCrit by around LatCrit's second annual con-
ference. She remained immersed in LatCrit very much guiding its efforts with Frank and bringing to
the fold people like myself. She left LatCrit sometime after Latcrit VIII (I was out of the country
during that year). But the parting and its aftereffects seemed anything but amenable and for some of
us represented a low moment for LatCrit as a community committed to life affirming practice, schol-
arship and safe space.
213. Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at 3-7.
214. 1d; Valdes, Under Construction, supra note 104, at 1090.
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tives and historical experiences; and who were raced differently, as
black, white, and/or mestizo, among other differences. Valdes envi-
sioned a larger pan-Latina/o identity, but one which both respected and
explored the diversities within the group while building solidarity among
the differently positioned individuals and groups within the larger pan-
ethnic collectivity.2t 5 From this perspective, to exclude white people,
black people or lesbian people or just about anybody else committed to
social justice, had the potential of excluding someone who might identify
as Latina/o. Further, the founders of LatCrit understood that those who
identified as non-Latina/o might have analogous experiences that would
also contribute to the building of LatCrit theory.
In this way, LatCrit faced the issue of antiessentialism in Latina/o
identity concretely in its experience of politically promoting group for-
mation for the purpose of producing knowledge and building commu-
nity. 216 The anti-essentialism critique had engendered substantial prior
debate in CRT, feminist, and other intellectual circles.217 It recognizes
that there is no single Latinalo essence, no coherent collective identity or
single experience that could reflect the common interests of the people
constituting the group "without acknowledging the intra-group differ-
ences, 218 and rejects the idea of essentialism in Blackness, Asian Ameri-
canness, women and the like. For example, CRT scholars joined other
women of color who had long challenged the category of "woman" in
feminist writings as largely reflecting the interest and priorities of white
middle class women in the United States and thus not representative of
all women's experience; a quintessential anti-essentialist critique. 219
Although LatCrit and other CRT related scholarship took an anti-
essentialist approach to the categories of blacks, Latina/os, Asian-
Americans, and/or women with regard to the dynamics and definition of
the groups, their formation was simultaneously premised on the prag-
matic idea that these essentialized group identities, having arisen in part
215. Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at 9.
216. Asian-American legal scholarship faced similar challenges. It focused on the unique and
varied experiences of Asian Americans in U.S. society. Asian Americans, like Latina/os, consist of
people from widely varying Asian communities and nationalities. Like Latina/os they experience a
racialized identity that often flattens misunderstands their differing ethnic diversities. Their experi-
ences often include an American view of them as foreign, thereby delegitimizing and limiting their
human potential while simultaneously holding them up as model minorities, as against other minori-
ties. ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 1-2
(1999); Aoki, supra note 1, at 1477; Chang, supra note 1, at 1303; Chang, supra note 26, at 87-96;
Gotanda, supra note 2, at 28; Saito, supra note 1, at 294-95.
217. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Introduction: Expanding Directions,
Exploding Parameters: Culture and Nation in LatCrit Coalitional Imagination, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 203, 227-232 (2000).
218. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Toward Progressive Conceptions of Black Manhood - LatCrit and
Critical Race Feminist Reflections Thought Piece, May 2001, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK
MASCULINITIES, supra note 107, at 55.
219. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 42, at 755.
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in response to oppression based on essentialism, had been and could be
used strategically, politically, and consciously to fight oppression.
220
The antiessentialist insight was complemented by intersectional the-
ory, which allowed for a more nuanced understanding of intra-group
difference. It simultaneously demonstrated the links between different
systems of subordination such as racism, sexism, and heterosexism as
located in the particular social positions of racial subgroups, such as Lati-
nas or black women. 221 Intersectional theory, first articulated as a the-
ory by Kimberl6 Crenshaw, drew upon black feminist thought which had
consistently argued that black women were not only oppressed by the
white supremacist system of racism but were also oppressed by the patri-
archal practices and system of sexism. 222 The theory thus explored the
experiences of black women at the intersection of racism and sexism,
rejecting a single-axis framework (race or gender) for understanding the
arguably doubly burdened conditions of black women.223 As such,
Crenshaw's concept of intersectionality, found a ready home and a site
for its further development in LatCrit 224  Asian American legal scholar-
ship, 22 5 and Critical Race Feminism, 226 as it had in CRT.227  Each of
these bodies of scholarship has made substantial contributions to further
220. OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 53-60 (suggesting that oppressed people come together
strategically for survival because they are oppressed based upon essentialized categories); see also
Robert S. Chang & Natasha Fuller, Performing LatCrit: Introduction, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1277,
1291-92 (2000) (citing Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions. Key Movements that
Performed the Theory, 33 U.C DAVIS L. REV. 1377, 1414 (2000)) (noting that: "unbounded anti-
essentialist theory can be disabling to community organizing, and 'once set in motion, antiessential-
ism unmodified has no limiting principles to prevent minority groups from being deconstructed until
all that remains are disunited and atomized individuals themselves.' Cho and Westley criticize the
second wave's fascination with anti-essentialism as 'the ahistorical pursuit of the 'theoretical' that
represents an abdication of political engagement and the relinquishment of the full promise of anti-
subordinationist intellectual production.' Anti-essentialist theory is understood here to be antithetical
to effective political organizing. If this is right, those within the field of CRT may be working at
cross purposes; perhaps CRT needs to reform itself and embrace what Professor Cho describes
elsewhere as 'essential politics."' (citations omitted)).
221. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, reprinted in part in POWER, PRIUEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 465-72 [hereinaf-
ter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing Intersection]; see also K.L. Broad, Critical Borderlands & Interdis-
ciplinary, Intersectional Coalitions, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2001); Crenshaw, Mapping
the Margins, supra note 18, at 1299; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Con-
sciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 7-9 (1989);.
222. See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 18, at 1252.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hemrndez-Truyol, Women 's Right as Human Rights-Rules and
Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 605, 610-11
(1996); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 1; see also discussion supra note 212 (role of Valdes
and Iglesias).
225. See. e.g., Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 1257, 1288 (1997).
226. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, at 177-79.
227. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 9-12; Matsuda, supra note 221, at 9. Much of the
discussion on multidimensionality is taken from and appears in my chapter on progressive black
masculinities. See PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES, supra note 105, at 21-23.
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developing the idea of intersectionality, including using it as a basis for
the emerging theory of multidimensionality.
B. Multidimensionality: An Emerging Theory?
The theory of multidimensionality captures three separate ideas.
First, it recognizes that an individual has many dimensions, some of
which are embodied human traits such as skin color, sex, ear-lobe length,
eye color; and others which are expressive, such as being Methodist or
Catholic, a cat owner or dog owner, etc. Second, multidimensionality
identifies some of these dimensions as materially relevant, 228 meaning
that a particular society has taken some dimensions such as color, sex, or
a particular religious belief (but not ear-lobe length or owning a cat or a
dog) and constructed meanings about the groups that possess them. It
then allocates or denies both material and status-related resources
through systems of racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism, for example.
These systems operate on the individuals who belong to groups that in-
habit or express a particular trait producing a host of experiences, re-
wards or demerits. Said differently, multidimensionality captures the
way society disadvantages people or benefits them primarily on the basis
of their possessing a particular trait. Thus, the second idea of multi-
dimensionality is a focus on systems of subordination and privilege, such
racism, sexism, and heterosexism.
229
Third, multidimensionality recognizes that these systems intersect,
inter-relate, and are mutually reinforcing so that for example, racism is
patriarchal and patriarchy is racist. In addition, however, the intersection
of two or more systems of disadvantage or privilege often produces
unique categories and experiences. So for example, intersectional theory
might suggest that black men are privileged by gender and oppressed by
race. 230 But this might not sufficiently explain racial profiling as a phe-
nomenon that happens most frequently to black men.23' Multidimen-
sionality, however, might better capture the idea that black men are
sometimes oppressed because they are "blackmen" one word, one posi-
tion, one socially, multidimensionally constructed oppressed group of
people-they are both black and men.232 The positionality of black-
men-one word-could be further analyzed by looking at the class or
another materially relevant status of those who are, in this example, ra-
cially profiled. In this sense, it replaces an approach that is additive, that
is, one that says, for instance, that poor black men are poor + black +
228. Valdes, Under Construction, supra note 107, at 1094.
229. Hutchinson, supra note 144, at 1199.
230. PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES, supra note 107. However, Stephanie Phillips has
pointed out to me that these interpretations may not be correct interpretations of the intersectional
theory. She argues instead that there is no meaningful difference between the theory of intersection-
ality and multidimensionality.
231. Id at 21-22.
232. ld at 23.
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men, to one that allows the analyst to explore the way that axes of clas-
sism, racism, and gender oppression mutually construct unique positions
for individuals and groups, while simultaneously demonstrating that
these same forces are implicated across identity categories.
And finally, multidimensionality is an approach. In recognizing, for
example, that racial oppression is also gendered, sexualized, and classed,
a multidimensional approach conceptually links the struggles of racial
justice, gender justice, and class justice; and has the potential to link the
differing groups fighting for these different types of justice. As such a
multidimensionality approach is an approach to building solidarity and
potentially coalitions.233
C. Antisubordination Praxis
Ideas about solidarity, multidimensionality and coalition-building
are meant both to inform and to serve the principle and project of anti-
subordination. In LatCrit, the commitment to antisubordination stated
explicitly at the beginning of the movement meant that LatCrit embraced
participation of people from other groups that had been historically op-
pressed. Thus, LatCrit embraced those who were fighting also against
heterosexism, and other sexually-based oppressions. This effort was
made easier by Valdes' participation, as he was known affectionately in
some quarters as the Queer Theory Philosopher after the publication of a
path-breaking piece on sexual identity.234 At the same time, LatCrit's
anti-subordination commitment 235 and its kinship with CRT led the or-
ganizers to consciously pursue both a theory and the practice of coalition
building as well as a theory of praxis-theory-informed practice and
practice-informed theory, as explored by Eric Yamamoto, among oth-
ers. 236  So for example, LatCrit developed a number of programmatic
devices that have been employed in LatCrit conference planning to help
balance the demands of facilitating their commitment to both anti-
essentialism and coalition building. One such device was the practice at
each conference of rotating centers, in which a non-Latina/o group's
experiences and insights were "centered" in a conference workshop for
exploration. In this way, LatCrit hoped to expand its theory, deepen its
knowledge about various groups' histories, and having brought these
groups into the conference, potentially to build coalitions with them.237
233. Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at 1094.
234. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex, " "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation " in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 3
(1995).
235. Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1265-67.
236. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 829 (1997).
237. Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1267. Another device not related to coalition building
was the practice of "streaming a topic," such as class. Streaming required that LatCrit would return
to a topic over a period of years in order to build upon previous and new insights.
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The idea of coalition building is also at the center of LatCrit, CRT
and other related scholarship's commitment to critical race praxis, as
developed by Eric Yamamoto.238 This concept is often termed "antisub-
ordination praxis," to encompass the many justice projects that inform
the antisubordination commitment. Yamamoto had been involved in
justice struggles that brought different but conflicting minority groups
together.239 Thus, the idea of coalition and alliances are a part of the
idea. But, a critical race praxis or antisubordination praxis also refers to
the idea that critical theorizing should and needs to be informed by prac-
tice, by active engagement with developments on the ground while prac-
tice should and needs to be informed by theorizing and theories about
what is happening, all for the benefit of oppressed communities. Yama-
moto's notion of critical race praxis is summarized as:
[Combining] critical, pragmatic, socio-legal analysis with political
lawyering and community organizing to practice justice by and for
racialized communities. Its central idea is that racial justice requires
antisubordination practice. In addition to ideas and ideals, justice is
something experienced through practice... It requires in appropriate
instances, using critiquing, and moving beyond notions of legal jus-
tice pragmatically to heal disabling wounds and forge intergroup alli-
ances. It also requires, for race theorists, enhanced attention to the-
ory translation and deeper engagement with frontline practice; and
for political lawyers and community activists, increased attention to a
critical rethinking of what race is, how civil rights are conceived, and
why law sometimes operates as a discursive power strategy.240
While this definition raises a number of provocative issues, two
seem particularly important. The first is the recognition that justice is
experienced through practice and that racial justice in particular requires
an antisubordination practice.24  These ideas capture and reinforce CRT
238. Yamamoto, supra note 236, at 829. For a fuller examination of the idea of critical race
praxis, particularly its focus on interracial healing or community building by CRT-related scholars,
see, e.g., Keith Aoki & Margaret Chon, Nanook of the Nomos: A Symposium on Critical Race
Praxis, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 35, 36 (1999); see also Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, Note, Taking Account of
Another Race: Refraining Asian-American Challenges to Race Conscious Admission in Public
Schools, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1283, 1312 -1318 (2001) (explaining critical race praxis as the pursuit
of interracial justice through antisubordination practice, political lawyering, and education. Anti-
subordination practice "seeks to disrupt the use of law as an instrument for perpetuating hierarchical
power relations. Political lawyering calls for "lawyers to play a more active role in working with
their minority clients to shape and guide antidiscrimination litigation" and "could involve bringing
lawsuits as part of a comprehensive impact strategy." The "educative function of litigation seeks to
increase "awareness of the court and parties alike about the interdependence of the legal rights of
opposing minority litigants as well as the distinctions between their historical and current experi-
ences of racial subordination" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Reginald Leamon
Robinson, Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity, and White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of
Critical Race Practice/Praxis, 53 AM. U.L. REv. 1361, 1365-66 (2004) (defining critical race praxis
in similar ways as antisubordination praxis but critiquing the race consciousness implicit in the idea).
239. Yamamoto, supra note 236, at 829.
240. Aoki & Chon, supra note 238, at 36 (summarizing Yamamoto, supra note 236).
241. See Yamamoto, supra note 236, at 880.
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notions that context is important and that what is considered fair will be
contextual on the one hand, and on the other that different groups will
have to work together to accomplish justice, the justice for healing their
intergroup wounds or otherwise. Second, Yamamoto insists that CRT
theorists translate theory into practical use for activist and legal practitio-
ners and that these practitioners think critically and theoretically about
what their work means and the ways it may be limited.242 This is best
accomplished by these groups working together, theorist and activist, to
mutually inform one another's work; and more importantly, to do so on
behalf of and in conjunction with communities of color. Critical race
and related scholarship theorists believe that engaged community work
and practice as well as attention to this work should dictate and inform
the contours of CRT theorizing, grounding it and potentially rendering it
more useful for community advancement. This idea is reminiscent of
their experiences of having grounded their critique of CLS scholarship in
the African American civil rights experience.243 However, antisubordi-
nation praxis requires something more than knowing an experience, it
requires active engagement.
These commitments and ideas, for instance, were institutionalized
in annual LatCrit conferences. The conferences were organized around
four functions, namely, "(1) the production of knowledge; (2) the ad-
vancement of social transformation; (3) the expansion and connection of
anti-subordination struggles; and (4) the cultivation of community and
coalition,",244 both within and beyond the confines of legal academia in
the United States. Further LatCrit established "early guideposts," that in
some ways mirrored but greatly expanded CRT tenets, evidencing a
commitment to antisubordination praxis and multidimen-
sional/antiessentialist theorizing. These were to:
[1] Recognize and Accept the Political Nature of Legal "Scholar-
ship" Despite Contrary Pressures.
[2] Conceive Ourselves as Activist Scholars Committed to Praxis to
Maximize Social Relevance.
[3] Build Intra-Latinalo Communities and Inter-Group Coalitions to
Promote Justice Struggles.
242. Id. at 828-30.
243. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note, 141 at 344-45. But antisubordination requires more than
just knowledge of an experience, it requires engagement. In a time of backlash; however, where
there is increasing ideological pressure to be blind to racial and racialized events, such as Hurricane
Katrina. See infra notes 300-16 and accompanying text (noting that being engaged may be simply
naming and re-naming, hearing, and re-telling the hearing of our experiences from our collective
perspective). But even this telling and retelling must be done in community or in some sort of mi-
nority public sphere.
244. Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1262; see Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at
1095; see Valdes, supra note 19, at notes 161, 175.
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[4] Find Commonalities While Respecting Differences to Chart So-
cial Transformation.
[5] Learn from Outsider Jurisprudence to Orient and Develop Lat-
Crit Theory and Praxis.
[6] Ensure a Continual Engagement of Self-Critique to Stay Princi-
pled and Grounded.
[7] Balance Specificity and Generality in LatCritical Analysis to
Ensure Multidimensionality.2 45
In addition, LatCrit institutionalized a host of projects in order to facili-
tate the production of critical scholarship and antisubordination prac-
246tice.
In these and other ways, LatCrit, CRT related scholarship and oth-
ers, such as queer legal theory, critical work on whiteness and on Native
Americans, have contributed valuable insights to the CRT project. The
insights into various social groups supply the knowledge base of CRT
and inform efforts to build coalitions among various groups. The infor-
mation and coalitions are meant to service the goal of antisubordination
praxis, a goal to which each of the groups is committed. In this sense,
what could be understood as a process of fragmentation can be seen as a
period of intense contextualized study that deepened the CRT project of
exposing the connections between race and law from a variety of per-
spectives. These efforts also have broadened the CRT project by bring-
ing more people to the table who understand and see the connections
between their and others' subordination and who might join coalitions
and the CRT project of fighting against racial oppression and all other
forms of subordination. This move from "color" to consciousness in-
formed by the understanding and appreciation of difference arguably
allows the multidimensionality of oppression to be attacked from a num-
ber of vantage points, ventures, and enterprises.
VII. CLASSCRITS?
Nevertheless, several scholars including critical race scholars them-
selves have criticized CRT scholarship for its focus on the words, dis-
course, and discursive patterns that support race, gender, and sexual con-
sciousness as opposed to the material determinants of these social sys-
245. Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1263; Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at 1095.
246. These include publishing essays from every conference and workshop resulting in pub-
lished symposia of LatCrit scholarship, securing coordinators and funding for future conferences
several years in advance, incorporating LatCrit into a not-for-profit corporation, establishing the
website www.latcrit.org, securing organizational NGO status for the purposes of participating in
international foray, founding CLAVE, a peer-reviewed periodical, and establishing numerous pro-
grams including a Student Scholar program. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1325.
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tems of subordination. 247  Specifically these scholars, in a variety of
ways, have called for analyses of the class system in U.S. society and the
way in which race, gender, and other forms of oppression mutually con-
struct and are constructed by it. 248 Although these calls may critique
CRT for ignoring "material factors," which Delgado defines as "issues
that turn on tangible events in the social or physical world,, 249 they more
often refer to and include 1) calls for exploring the economics of race, a
call that narrows the concept of materiality to ideas about the economy as
a significant determining factor in racial outcomes, or 2) calls for specifi-
cally exploring the class system as the product of economic relations and
economic ordering-the product of the production and distribution of
goods and services.25°
While much of CRT scholarship seems focused on discourse, race
as a function of ideas, and race as culture, individual CRT and LatCrit
scholars have consistently focused on the class/materialist elements of
race, such as John Calmore's focus on housing, 25' Enrique Carrasco's
focus on development, 252 and Kevin Johnson's focus on immigration;
253
247. Harris, supra note 42, at 777-78 (suggesting that mce-crits "return to the vexed question
of the relationship between race and class" and noting that "[t]he current interest in theories of
culture has all but crowded out materialist work on race and racism"); see, e.g., Delgado, Blind
Alleys, supra note 17, at 122.
248. See, e.g., Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 17, at 125-28 (calling for CRT to return to the
materialist traditions of the first generation of CRT scholars such as Derrick Bell). Delgado also
calls specifically for an examination of the relationship between race and class. Id. at 151; see also
Carbado & Gulati, supra note 150, at 1757 (suggesting that CRT use the insights being developed
within the field of law and economics to analyze workplace discrimination); Harris, supra note 42, at
777-78. See generally Jennifer Hochschild, Symposium: Going Back to Class? The Reemergence of
Class in Critical Race Theory, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 99 (2005).
249. Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race, supra note 17, at 2280 n.20 (defining material
factors as those "that turn on tangible events in the social or physical world").
250. I am defining class very broadly in order to leave open for discussion and later considera-
tion new theories that better define the idea. At the same time, I am adopting the multiple meanings
that I believe Delgado seeks to capture in talking about the material determinants of racism. For
instance, though Delgado defines material factors as those "that turn on tangible events in the social
or physical world[,]" he explains that he, at times, uses "the terms 'material' or 'economic determin-
ism' as synonymous with 'racial realism."' at n.38. He encompasses the ideas of economic rela-
tions by suggesting that it is racial realist, referring specifically to Derrick Bell, who understands that
"racism is a means by which our system allocates privilege, status, and wealth." Delgado, Blind
Alleys, supra note 17, at 123. Further, he captures what I consider in part class dynamics when he
notes that racism serves "the 'political and economic ends' of 'powerful whites."' Id at n.16 (citing
Bell, supra note 65). These ideas are partially captured in his comments: "[W]hile text, attitude, and
intention may play important roles in our system of racial hierarchy, material factors such as profits
and the labor market are even more decisive in determining who falls where in that system."
Delgado, Blind Alley, supra note 17, at 123.
251. See generally Calmore, supra note 41; John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Profes-
sional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1927, 1948-49 (1999); John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act
at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067 (1998).
252. Enrique R. Carrasco, Critical Race Theory and Post-Colonial Development: Radically
Monitoring the World Bank and the IMF, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, supra note 1, at 366-75; Enrique R. Carrasco, Opposition, Justice, Structuralism, and
Particularity: Intersections between LatCrit Theory and Development Studies, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 313, 327-35 (1997); Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in
Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J.
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while others have written one or more class-related articles. 254 Further,
LatCrit has periodically, but repeatedly, focused on class, economic ine-
quality, and the economics of race in their conferences, 255 as have CRT
scholars in symposia such as the Washington and Lee Symposium "CRT
and the Next Frontier., 256  In addition, promising new work in the area
of class and race has emerged in law and in other fields. 257 However, a
systematic analysis of class, particularly as a product of economic order-
ing, as well as its relationship to race has not yet emerged, even though
critical race scholars have argued for years that the class system in the
U.S. mutually constructs race, gender, and other forms of oppression.
Below I briefly proffer a number of reasons that may explain why
CRT and related scholarship has not yet developed a more systematic
analysis of class. I then posit that the critical study of law and class or
classcrits, while open to further definition, is necessary to examine the
ways in which class mutually constructs race, further grounds analyses of
racism, and guides antisubordination praxis.
A. Tendencies, Tensions and Fears as Obstacles to Critical Class
Analysis
There are three central tendencies within CRT and related scholar-
ship that may explain why this scholarship has failed to adequately en-
gage in critical class analyses. Each tendency involves a tension between
material/class and discourse-focused examinations. The discursive sides
INT'L L. 221, 221-45 (1994); Enrique R. Carrasco & Randolph Thomas, Encouraging Relational
Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis,
34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 545-55 (1996).
253. Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and Califor-
nia's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV.
629, 633-642 (1995). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation ": Race, Immigra-
tion, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 1 1(1996); Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or
"Ring of Fire "?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997),
reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L.J. 173 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in
Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L. REV. 675 (2000).
254. See Kevin R. Johnson, Roll Over Beethoven: "A Critical Examination of Recent Writing
about Race," 82 TEX. L. REV. 717, 722-26 (2004) (responding to Delgado's critiques in Delgado,
Blind Alleys, supra note 17 and critiquing him for overlooking much scholarship that addresses the
concerns he raises and exploring the plethora of articles that have a class/materialist focus).
255. Two of the eleven LatCrit conferences held thus far specifically focused on class and
economic issues. See LATCRIT Latina & Latino Critical Theory, http://personal.law.miami.edu/
-fvaldes/latcrit/latcrit/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). These were LatCrit V titled "Class in
LatCrit: Theory and Praxis of Economic Inequality," and Latcrit X titled "Critical Approaches to
Economic Injustice." Id. See also Johnson, supra note 254 (listing numerous examples of the es-
says discussing the relationship between class and race).
256. Brown, supra note 146, at 1499.
257. See, e.g., MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 35-38 (2d ed. 2006); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
161, at 4. Legal scholars too have begun to investigate these issues from a variety of perspectives.
See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY, AND ECONOMICS (2005); A WOMAN'S PLACE, supra note 43;
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
DIMENSIONS (Jeanne M. Woods & Hope Lewis eds., 2005).
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of these tensions, however, are complementary in ways that reinforce the
discursive turn in CRT scholarship. The first tension lies in the inherent
nature of the legal profession, which while structuring material condi-
tions does so through language and discourse. The second tension lies in
CRT's embrace of post-modernist theories, which focuses on discourse
as a significant site of power, in part because humans primarily under-
stand the material world through ideas and language.258 These theories,
however, recognize that humans are material beings in a material
world.259 The third tension is found in CRT's embrace of the idea that
race is socially constructed, which given its development in CRT lends
itself toward a focus on consciousness, 260 even though consciousness is
shaped by and shapes materiality. These tensions are compounded by
additional political and academic issues that may further reinforce the
tendencies toward discourse analyses as opposed to the materiality of
economic relations, economic ordering, and class.
The first tension is implicated in the nature of law itself. Legal
work primarily consists of manipulating language and discourse in the
process of structuring arguments. Though these arguments are some-
times meant to effectuate particular material arrangements and may both
unleash and justify the use of coercive power, these events are accom-
plished through legal discourse. This occupational feature may mean
that legal academics in particular, who may be removed from the rough
and tumble of legal practice, are more comfortable mining text, lan-
guage, and discourses for their meaning, rather than tracking their mate-
rial effects or responding with concrete strategies to a particular material
event. Nevertheless, law through discourse structures material condi-
tions in part by allocating and regulating resources. It decides who the
winners and losers are, on what terms trade will be conducted and what
kinds of property will be protected.
While many of these issues are explored as individual concepts
through the traditional liberal legal discourse of contract, property, trade,
and corporate law, or even welfare and poverty law; and are increasingly
examined through the overlay onto law of the standard neo-classical eco-
258. See Shane Phelan, (Be)Coming Out: Lesbian Identity & Politics, 18 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN
CULTURE & Soc'Y 765, 768-69 (1993) (describing the poststructuralist and postmodernist project as
one challenging and seeking to unravel the historicity of truth claims rather than engaging in argu-
mentation about whether something is true or not). Phelan describes poststructualism as being more
modernist in tone, "retaining some measure of confidence in the Enlightenment ideas of reason and
freedom while indicting modem Western societies for betraying these categories even as they osten-
sibly serve them." Id. at 768. In this sense it uses deconstruction or engages genealogy to note gaps
between what the West says it is or promises and what it does. On the other hand, postmodernist
such as Derrida seek "continually to disrupt modem categories even as they rely on them." Id at
768. Phelan notes one can be both a poststructuralist and a post modernist but "no affinity necessar-
ily exists between the two." Id.
259. John Lye, Some Post-Structuralist Assumptions (1996-97), http://www.brocku.ca/english/
courses/4F70/poststruct.htm.
260. Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race, supra note 17, at 2285; Delgado, Blind Alleys,
supra note 17, at 123.
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nomic discourse as in the Law and Economics tradition, it might be help-
ful to begin to examine the web of historically-decided economic policies
that constitute the background and hegemonic economic code of law.
Litowitz describes this code, worldview or web of social policies as in-
cluding "private ownership of property, employment at will, inheritance,
freedom of contract, limited liability for business organizations, patriar-
chy, and a regime of negative rights that ensures that individuals must
secure their own health care, day care, and other benefits.",261 Here, one
might add white supremacy as an economic imperative of the code.26 2
And, one might question who and which social groups may have pushed
and/or been best served by these policies and their combination. So for
instance, while notions of private property may have a history that pre-
dates the founding of the United States, arguably the fact that the found-
ing fathers belonged to the property owning class may be a significant
factor in its being enshrined in the U.S. Constitution to protect such own-
ership. In any event, this web of policies, I believe, help to mark the
boundaries of the reproduction of class within the United States that op-
erates both independently and mutually with other subordinating struc-
tures to limit the material well being of many people including racial and
other minorities. This code, perhaps to the chagrin of its author, provides
us an entry into class.263
The focus on language and discourse as an inherent feature of mod-
em legal work is reinforced by the post structuralism/modemism of CRT
that suggests that power is located in discourses. That is, power is lo-
cated in rule-governed discourses that shape the features of a society and
individual identity and are constructed over time (historically deter-
261. Litowitz, supra note 68, at 540.
262. While this may seem like a political imperative rather than an economic one, it is not clear
if these two things can be separated in the American social order. Slavery was a racialized economic
system; it was both economic and political. See Matsuda, supra note 141, at 334; see also, Anthony
Farley, Accumulation, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 51 (2005) (suggesting that race and class are cre-
ated in the same moment of primal accumulation in which the differences between the haves and the
have-nots is marked on the body, marked racially). Slavery and Jim Crow later did not simply block
access to equal services, but also to equal access to resources, jobs, and the like. See WOODWARD,
supra note 32, at 7-16. Similarly Colorblindness may do the same by leaving intact and allowing
white communities to build on the historical advantages locked in through slavery, segregation, and
discrimination. See Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9
MICH. J. RACE & L. 31, 33-34 (2003); reprinted in 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 197 (2004) (discussing
the manner in which advantages get locked-in over time using the economic model that in part
explains the advantages monopolies maintain long after the anticompetitive behavior has ceased). In
addition, an easily managed or "efficient" workplace may require homogeneity in personnel, or in
America, whiteness. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 150, at 1762. Pleasing the affluent customer
may mean hiring salespeople with whom this particular type of customer may be most comfortable.
See generally id. In the United States, white people are proportionately more affluent than say black
people.
263. Litowitz certainly rejects the notion of class in the Marxian sense as the fount of all op-
pression. See Litowitz, supra note 68, at 534. He also rejects the idea that law is an instrument of
class. Id. But he more generally seems to reject notions of class because the modem economy has
begun to "blur class divisions." Id.; see also infra note 293-95 and accompanying text. See gener-
ally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2005) (making a similar point).
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mined) through social action. 264 Though these discourses appear as in-
struments of some sort of specific knowledge, to in fact reveal knowl-
edge,265 there are multiple and overlapping discourses and all manner of
people have some power to contest these discourses-these sites of
power. This is so even though some people have more power to influ-
ence the content and development of discourse than others.266 For law-
yers and non-lawyers alike, these insights might easily be seen as a de-
scription of law. Law appears as a specialized body of knowledge, that
often establishes, or rather reveals the boundaries of appropriate action,
and perhaps-though less apparent-thought. Further, just about anyone
can bring a suit or contest the discourse, and it is clearly a site of power.
It is a site of power not only because it is backed by coercion but also
because the language of law as socio-historically developed, itself is so-
cially meaningful and powerful-"I know my rights; this is my prop-
erty." At this level the post-structuralist description of discourse as
power not only seems to describe law but also reinforces the centered-
ness of discourse in law.
Delgado captures this idea when he suggests that CRT scholars fa-
vor analyses that emphasize "texts, narratives, ideas, and meanings" be-
cause they understand these as giving rise to racial discrimination by
conveying messages "that people of other racial groups are unworthy,"
and thus locating racial power in discourse.267 He criticizes these types
of analyses as leading writers to focus on and "analyze hate speech, me-
dia images, census categories, and such issues as intersectionality and
essentialism. 2 68 But he argues that "while text, attitude, and intention
may play important roles in our system of racial hierarchy, material fac-
264. Here I am drawing particularly on Michel Foucault's work and understanding him as the
central poststructuralist theorist. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY
OF STORY OF INSANITY 1N THE AGE OF REASON (Richard Howard trans., 2001); Litowitz, supra note
68, at 534 (describing this work in part); see also Roger Jones, Post Structuralism, by Roger Jones,
http://www.philosopher.org.uk/poststr.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (describing Foucault as the
central poststructuralist theorist).
265. Litowitz, supra note 68, at 534 (drawing on Michel Foucault's and explaining the way in
which discourses appear as instruments of knowledge and noting, "psychoanalysis favors the male
experience (the Oedipal drama) and thereby marginalizes women, just as the discourse of medicine
tends to medicalize the behavior of those who stand outside established social categories (e.g., ho-
mosexuals were considered 'sick')"). See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 264.
266. FRASER, supra note 210, at 154. The idea of multiple sites of power seems to be in some
tension with the idea of a single hegemonic order. Litowitz, in arguing for a reconsideration of
Gramsci's theory of hegemony suggests that the critical legal studies in using Gramsci, never re-
solved the tension between Gramsci's understanding of hegemony as a tool of the dominant eco-
nomic class and other ideas of hegemony as a product of structure. See Litowitz, supra note 68, at
549. He rejects the idea that law reflects a dominant class and appears to reject the idea of class in
general given this moment of advanced capitalism but he argues there is a dominant or hegemonic
code that relates to economic issues socially constructed over time. Id. He suggests that someone
fighting for welfare rights is not fighting against a class but rather a code, a worldview. Id.
267. Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 17, at 123.
268. Id.
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tors such as profits and the labor market are even more decisive in de-
termining who falls where in that system. 269
The strong focus of post structuralism/modemism on discourse and
CRT's embrace of it, however, may squeeze out other poststructuralist
insights about materiality.270 So for instance, post structuralism under-
stands human beings as "material beings, "embodied and present in the
physical world, entrenched in the material practices and structures of
their society -- working, playing, procreating, living as parts of the mate-
rial systems of society., 271  Thus while humans may dream of crossing
the Atlantic, and may do so by engaging materiality using a boat or
plane, it is unlikely they can swim across it, even if they think they can.
In this sense, the idea of discursive power does not negate the reality of
material constraints, and equally important, it does not negate the reality
of coercive power-violence-as a creator, consequence and tool of
power. Coercive power is simply another axis of power in addition to
discursive power. 272  And the idea of discursive power, itself, though
said to reside in many places and posited as contested and contestable
rather than as a "one-way imposition by a dominant" group, 73 does not
negate the idea of dominant groups or classes (which may have greater
power to say what is authoritative). Rather, these dominant groups may
be powerful and their views may be hegemonic, but they are neither
monolithic nor are their views the only game in town. 7 4 Further, the
very notion of discursive power also points to lopsided or unequal rela-
tionships that are all too often the products and producers of unequal and
in-egalitarian material relations. 275 In this sense, post-structuralism may
remind us that "it's more than the economy, stupid." But, it does not
negate economic conditions even if human understanding of these condi-
tions is mediated through language. Thus while post-structuralism's
analyses of discourse may reinforce the centeredness of the discourse of
law, it, in and of itself, need not preclude a focus on economic structures
269. Id.
270. See generally FRASER, supra note 210 (indicating a need for both).
271. See Lye, supra note 259. This is so even though they suggest that human beings can only
appreciate the material world though ideas and language.
272. Litowitz, supra note 68, at 518-19.
273. Id. at 534; see also Jones, supra note 264.
274. Litowitz, supra note 68, at 550-51 (noting that postmodemists recognize that there are
dominant groups and arguing that just because there are multiple discourses at the local level does
not negate that there is a hegemonic discourse at the meta level of law). See generally Mutua, Theo-
rizing Progressive Black Masculinities, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES supra note 107
(discussing ideal American masculinity as hegemonic, but not the only idea of masculinity that
exists in society); Patricia Hill Collins, A Telling Difference: Dominance, Strength, and Black Mas-
culinities, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES, supra note 107, at 73 (noting that while there is
a dominant hegemonic masculinity, all masculinities across racial, ethnic, and other groups contain
hegemonic ideas such as, white men encounter a hegemonic masculinity that dictates what white
men should be and do and black men encounter ideas that tell them what they, as black men, should
be and do).
275. See FRASER, supra note 210, 11- 33 (noting that it is difficult to have dignity and respect
for all identities in the absence of an egalitarian society).
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and relations as decisive determinants of class status and significant fea-
tures in the construction of race.
If the practice of law is centered on discourse and CRT's post struc-
turalism emphases on examining discourse reinforces the tendency to-
ward a focus on discursive maneuvers, then the development of CRT's
basic premise that race is socially constructed, has sometimes been un-
derstood in ways to further bolster the discursive turn. Delgado argues
that it is the idea of the social construction of race that is at the crux of
the discursive turn. He suggests it leads to a focus on "race" instead of
race. 276 By this he means that CRT has tended to focus on defining race,
thinking about how it works, theorizing its processes as located in
"[i]deal factors -- thoughts, discourse, stereotypes, feelings, and mental
categories[,] '' 27 7 rather than focusing on how race works in the real
world, and the way it functions as an ordering principle in a world of
power, resources, and privilege.278 The idea of race as a social construc-
tion suggests that race is not some immutable biological characteristic
but rather a socio-historical process through which society assigns mean-
ings to different types of human bodies. 279 These meanings are unstable
and changing but deeply structured over time not only by consciousness
but also by material constraints, economic imperatives, institutionalized
practices, and other social ordering features of society. 280 That is, it is
shaped by materiality as much as by consciousness. And yet, somehow
the idea that race is socially constructed has developed in a way to sug-
gest that race is simply a product of consciousness unrelated to material-
ity-a consciousness that seems to hover above and beyond social life
281and practice.
So, for instance, some CRT scholars see unconscious racism as the
biggest obstacle to racial justice.282 This is true to the extent that uncon-
scious racism allows people to continue to act in racist ways while simul-
taneously believing that racism no longer exists. This may engender in
them apathy or hostility to racial justice activism. But this view ignores
the ways in which race is economically, socially, and institutionally
grounded and reproduced even where individuals are present and con-
sciously committed to eradicating racism. Others seem to suggest that as
race is simply a product of consciousness and not real, that race con-
276. Delgado, BlindAlleys, supra note 17, at 1 36.
277. Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race, supra note 17, at 2280.
278. THE LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 1, at 17.
279. OMI & WiNANT, supra note 26, at 55.
280. Id. at 56 (noting that race is a matter of both structure an cultural representation).
281. Much in Delgado's piece leads me to think his understanding of the social construction of
race as an "idea" focused and as a product of consciousness is related to Lawrence's notion of "un-
conscious racism." Charles R. Lawrence, 11I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
With Unconscious Racism, in CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 235-57. I in someone ways
share this intuition, and thus see this idea as a quirky function of the development of the idea of
social construction rather than something inherent.
282. Brown, supra note 146, at 1489-91.
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sciousness should be eliminated as a strategy for addressing racial injus-
tice. Instead, they emphasize spiritual transformation.283 While I am
sympathetic to this type of thinking, it does not provide a theory about
the process of transformation, given embodiment. That is, it does not
contemplate the limitations and compromises that material (human) em-
bodiment imposes on spiritual consciousness as manifested in the world
or the way constraints are further materialized in social systems and in-
stitutional structures. Nor does it suggest the process for transforming
them.284 In addition, to say race is not biological is not to say it is not
real. 85 Further, to say race is a social construction, again, is not to say
that race is not real. Money is the preeminent social construction as a
medium of exchange. No one seems to suggest that money is not real or
rather that the consequences of having or not having money in the con-
text of modem economies is somehow unreal.286 These ideas detach the
consciousness of social construction from the materiality of social con-
struction and they mistakenly uproot racism from its material basis as
well as detach race from class.
Nevertheless the idea and prominence of racial consciousness or
unconsciousness as developed within the idea of the social construction
283. See Robinson, supra note 238, at 155-58.
284. Here, the process of transforming these material constraints on consciousness or calling
into existence a different reality requires something more than consciousness or thought but may
well entail a combination of thought, speech, and action or action and speech that changes the condi-
tions of consciousness. As such it might well require or be well served by race consciousness that
produces the actions that would help dismantle the structural and material conditions that reinforce
the conscious conceptions. See generally NEALE DONALD WALSCH, CONVERSATIONS WITH GOD:
AN UNCOMMON DIALOGUE (Book 1) (1996).
285. OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 55.
286. One can argue that money is a social construction. It is certainly not biological but it is a
function of human interaction. Money is a medium of exchange. Further, expressions of money,
such as the one-dollar bill and a twenty-dollar bill can be said to be the same, in the way that people,
are viewed the same, as humans. That is, these bills are made out of the same sort of paper, with
roughly equivalent amounts of ink, thus their value from this perspective is the same. However,
people do not value the twenty-dollar bill the same as they do the one-dollar bill, nor do they say the
bills have equal value. This difference is real, not as a matter of biology or substance, but is real
because a zillion transactions every day make them real and make the difference between the bills
real. This difference is buttressed not only a billion people believing that the difference between the
dollar bills is real, and acting like they are different everyday (consciousness made real,) but is also
buttressed and made real by a variety of systems and institutions such as the U.S. economy and the
global economy, the federal reserve bank, the stock market, the real estate agent, and the grocery
store down the street, etc.
In addition, people's belief systems about the dollar in general could rapidly change,
leading to its abandonment as a system or medium of exchange. However, such an outcome would
likely be precipitated by some enormous event, and not because a small group of people, marginal
and outside the mainstream, with limited control over the production of money and its accumulation
wished or believed it so. Additionally, the value or perception of say, twenty dollars does not remain
the same over time, twenty dollars thirty years ago was more valuable. And finally, and more im-
portant to analysis of class to the extent that access to money is allowed to determine a person's
access to status, goods and services, the systems by which it produced and allocated creates classes,
races, genders etc., designed to perform both and different economic and psychological functions.
Race is structural and made real in a similar way that money is. Further, capitalism, the system we
now inhabit, guides this process buttressed and ordered in part by law and makes access to money in
its various forms the key to accessing resources, the absence of which helps delineate class and race.
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of race, further fortifies the discursive turn in CRT. This turn, to the
extent it focuses on discourse, may occlude a focus on materiality and
therefore on economic and class issues.
But political and other analytical pressures also exist that may have
hindered the development of class analyses within CRT and strengthened
the tendency toward the discursive turn. For example, hesitancy to take
on class may result from fear of analyzing or critiquing capitalism, the
reigning economic order, given the political environment that champions
unfettered capitalism as a panacea for all ills despite its apparent ten-
dency to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few. This tendency unin-
terrupted by policy decisions to curb it or disrupt its lopsided material
distributions, has increasingly created and cemented vast economic ine-
qualities in the social system, widening and hardening the gap between
the rich and the poor.287 However, engagement with class issues as a
potential critique of this situation may be seen as politically difficult and
unpopular given the politics of triumphant which celebrate the failure of
communism and conclude the inadequacy of Marxist analyses with their
particular emphasis on class divisions.288
This fear may be bolstered by economic analyses which understand
current economic arrangements as necessary and natural and which in-
form us everyday that the maintenance and creation of the rich are indis-
pensable and beneficial to the rest of us, including the middle, working,
and poor classes, 289 while suggesting that policies which put the well-
287. The London Financial Times published a three-part series discussing growing economic
inequality in the United States and the stagnation of wages. See Krishna Guha, Edward Luce, &
Andrew Ward, Anxious Middle: Why Ordinary Americans Have Missed Out on the Benefits of
Growth, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 2006 (commentary) (part one of three); Krishna Guha, Ed-
ward Luce, & Alim Remtulla, Seeking Shelter: Why Democrats are in Retreat From Their Free
Trade Record, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 3, 2006 (commentary) (part two of three); Alan Beattie,
Sans Safety Net, 'Creative Destiny' Spurs America, Nov. 6, 2006 (commentary) (part three of three);
see also Lawrence Summers, The Global Middle Cries out for Reassurance, FIN. TIMES (London),
Oct. 30, 2006 (commentary); ROBERT PERUCCI & EARLY WYSONG, THE NEW CLASS SOCIETY 3-34
(1999) (suggesting that class mobility is stagnating); JEFF FAUX, THE GLOBAL CLASS WAR: HOW
AMERICA'S BIPARTISAN ELITE LOST OuR FUTURE - AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN IT BACK 49-
75 (2006) (noting the increasing gap between rich and poor and commenting that while racism,
sexism and other forms of oppression seem to be decreasing, class inequalities are growing); Robert
D. Atkinson, Inequality in the New Knowledge Economy, in THE NEW EGALITARIANISM 52, 54-55
(Antony Giddens & Patrick Diamond eds., 2005) (discussing growing inequality that began in the
late 1970's and explaining that this phenomenon covers not only inequitable distribution of income
but also the distribution of jobs with the share of jobs with middle income also shrinking). The
result is an economy that is crating a U-shaped job-market with more job increases found at the top
and the bottom. Id.
288. Litowitz, supra note 68, at 534-5.
289. Recall for instance, President Ronald Reagan's supply-side economics, derisively termed
"trickle-down economics," which put the rich at the center of tax-reduction for the so-called benefit
of greater production. Marjorie E Komhauser, The Morality Of Money: American Attitudes Toward
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 154-56 (1994). The rich, the theory suggested would
take the money saved from lower taxes and invest it, stimulating the economy and therefore provid-
ing overall growth and benefits that would trickle down to the rest of us. Id. Instead, the rich got
richer and the United States deficit soared, later restraining investment in social spending because
the deficit had to be reduced. Id; see, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy
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being of the vast majority humanity at the center of economic ordering
and development are destructive. And it may be further bolstered by the
legal code of economic policy choices, described earlier, that protects the
regime of "private ownership of property, employment at-will, inheri-
tance, freedom of contract, limited liability for business organizations,
patriarchy, and a regime of negative rights that ensures that individuals
must secure their own health care, day care, and other benefits. 29°
At the same time, a hesitancy to take on class may arise from deep
within CRT itself. Race in America cuts across class. So for instance,
the working class is and has historically been divided by race.29 ' But
class also divides race,292 a fact CRT recognizes in its antiessentialist
notions, which call for racial solidarity and unity as a political commit-
ment rather than as an essential fact. However, a class analysis may
nonetheless require race crits to acknowledge their own class standing
and interest as part of an educated elite. This interrogation might sug-
gests among other things, that their interest in being and remaining a part
of this elite class is in tension with the empowerment of the racialized
underclass, which empowerment is both the producer and product of a
radically transformed social order. Said differently, in order for the
masses of racialized underclasses to live well, the current system which
privileges the educated elite will need to be transformed. Empowerment
of these classes is both the prerequisite and desired outcome of this trans-
formation. Seen from another perspective, race crits may not look at
class because they are less affected by the oppressive mechanisms of
class, even as these accompany racial oppression.
There may also be a number of other analytical obstacles to CRT
taking on class analyses. For instance, Litowitz argues that central in-
sights of Marxism (as the most important theory of class relations) are no
longer adequate explanations of or salient factors in advanced capitalism
Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAx REv. 671, 729-734 (2006) (providing brief discus-
sions of trickle down economics and explaining trickle down theory, noting that there is no reliable
proof that tax cuts for the rich will stimulate growth and explaining that although George W. Bush
calls himself a Christian that his tax policies fail to meet a Christian ethics that would require those
who benefit the most from society to contribute-as part of sacrifice-more for its upkeep and
requiring that revenues raised be sufficient to ensure vulnerable people an opportunity to live up to
their God given potential); see also Audrey Farlane, The New Inner City: Transformation, concen-
trated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 4-5 (2006) (dis-
cussing recent city urban planning goals of attracting a more affluent population on the theory that
they will bring needed resources to the city by which poorer communities will benefit but finding
that the poorer communities disappear, get relocated and do not benefit from this focus).
290. Litowitz, supra note 68, at 549 (referring to the code also as a worldview and explaining
that "social reform involves subversion of a dominant rationality").
291. See, e.g., Herbert G. Gutman, Black Coal Miners and the Greenback-Labor Party in
Redeemer, Alabama: 1878-1879, The Letters of Warren D. Kelley, Willis Johnson Thomas, "Daw-
son," and Others, 10 LAB. HIST. 506, 506 (1969); Herbert G. Gutman, Reconstruction in Ohio:
Negroes in the Hocking Valley Coal Mines in 1873 and 1874, 3 LAB. HIST. 243, 243-44 (1962). See
generally ROEDIGER, supra note 116.
292. 1 owe this line of argument to Robert Chang.
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
where class lines have become blurry. 93 For example, he poses the fol-
lowing situation and question. "A female computer consultant for IBM
speculates on the stock market at night and owns a studio apartment that
she rents to a janitor. To what class does she belong?, 294 While a de-
finitive answer may not arise under traditional Marxist theory of class,
rethinking class in light of modem theories, current practices, and con-
crete economic developments may provide a sophisticated analysis of
this scenario.295 Equally important however, is that the demonstration of
blurry class lines does not render class as an economic feature or an ana-
lytical or political tool non-existent. In fact critical race analysis may be
helpful in this regard. So for instance, race, Latinos, blacks, as groups,
as political projects, as analytical categories are "blurry"-in-essential,
non-monolithic, unstable, socially constructed, and difficult to define.
Yet, they exist because we create and recreate them structurally, politi-
cally, intellectually and discursively. Though a slightly different process
is at work in the case of class, and perhaps gender, these social processes
and phenomenon exists at multiple levels.
And finally, CRT may have failed to adequately engage class analy-
sis because, as Angel Harris suggests, we may simply have lost the lan-
guage for talking about class given the declining currency of Marxist
theory.296 Or it may be that in light of the law and economics tradition,
CRT scholars believe it necessary and are reluctant to master another
field such as economics. In any case, this failure is puzzling given
CRT's suggestion that class mutually constructs race on the one hand,
and on the other, given its success in contributing to the examination of
other subordinating systems, such as gender oppression, (intersectional-
ity)297 and potentially gay, lesbian, and queer oppression (multidimen-
sionality).298
B. Why ClassCrits?
My thoughts on what class is and what a critical class analysis
might reveal are provisional. However, it appears important for CRT to
engage and develop a critical class analysis because mapping out the
different economic classes, the power relations between them, and the
way law operates on them, as it has in the context of the systems of race,
gender, and sexuality is crucial to understanding the ways in which class
mutually supports these other systems. In addition, a class analysis may
further ground examinations of racism and racist practices and poten-
tially guide CRT's antisubordination praxis.
293. Litowitz, supra note 68, at 534.
294. Id. at 534; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 263.
295. For new ideas about class, see, e.g., PERUCCI & WYSONG, supra note 287, at 3-34; FAUX,
supra note 287, at 49-75 (discussing the existence of an international elite class).
296. Harris, supra note 42, at 777.
297. See supra note 18.
298. See supra note 19.
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Classes arguably arise out of the division of labor and the stratifica-
tion of society in producing, distributing, and perhaps even in consuming
goods and services. 299 A critical class analysis, then, presumably not
only interrogates such concerns as supply and demand, wages and pro-
ductivity and ultimately how goods, services, wealth, and surplus are
created and allocated, but also interrogates the power relations and power
differentials between different economic groups in society and the ways
they are being maintained or changed. From a critical perspective, par-
ticularly in the context of CRT, there is a special concern about oppres-
sive class relations and ways to eliminate them as well as a focus on con-
text. That is, a critical class analyses rejects abstract notions of effi-
ciency, insisting instead on inquiries as to who the players are, who the
beneficiaries are, whose needs are accommodated, 30 0 and whose needs
are not, why some allocations are deemed efficient and others not, and,
which is skeptical of claims of neutrality and efficiency where the crys-
tallized protections of a privileged group status have not been investi-
gated in the given context. In this vein, critical class theory might have
something to say or to ask about the groups produced in the modern so-
cial economic processes and the current moment in which segmented
joblessness and stagnating wages for the overwhelming majority of the
population exist in the face of increasing productivity, a growing econ-
omy, staggering profits, and incomprehensible executive pay as mediated
by the corporation and justified by an array of people institutionally and
otherwise placed. 301
In addition, a class analysis may further ground examinations of ra-
cism and racist practices because it focuses on the economic allocations
of material resources accumulated over the last several hundred years,
much of which has been racialized. It is unlikely that these racialized
allocations (whether productive or distributive) will be eliminated with-
out addressing the structural and economic foundations of class. Nor is it
clear that class and the economic harms of lower class status can be
eliminated without addressing both the material and psychological seduc-
tions embodied and structured by race. Ultimately, the best way to ad-
dress these issues may not simply be calling for the edification and re-
spect of different groups but the difficult work of building coalitions to
demand concrete economic and material changes for those oppressed by
race and class as well as those oppressed by class across race. Four
299. These are relatively typical elements in the definition of class. See FRASER, supra note
210, at 17 (making a similar point).
300. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Illusion of Efficiency in Worker's Compensation "Re-
form, " 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 657, 666-67, 716-50 (1998) (unraveling the neoeconomic rhetoric of
efficiency versus redistribution distinction makes redistribution claims seem suspect).
301. James Bernstein, Q&A: Working Harder and Taking Home Less, NEWSDAY, Aug. 29,
2006; Rex Nutting, Bernanke Overstates Wage Growth: Earnings are not Catching up with Produc-
tivity, Government Figures Show, MAKETWATCH, Jul. 19, 2006; see also Steven Greenhouse &
David Leonhardt, Real Wages Fail to Match A Rise in Productivity, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006.
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questions raised in the context of Hurricane Katrina might exemplify
these points.3 °2
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many commentators questioned
whether the government's slow, seemingly disinterested response and
inadequate rescue of the thousands of mostly African American people
stranded in the flooded city of New Orleans was the result of racism.
30 3
That is, they wondered whether the government's pitiful response was
not just evidence of incompetence but rather occurred because the vic-
tims were black.304  This is a typical race consciousness question and
race questions are increasingly formulated in this manner.305  It gets at
what Rory calls the sadism of the American social order. It is about the
motivation and lack of it of white Americans, white officials providing
justice to black Americans. It is about conscious and unconscious ra-
cism. It is about the current and momentary intent of individuals, about
the intentional conduct of current players. It is often countered by efforts
to shame the perpetuators, but has the effect of making invisible those
affected by such policies.30 6 This shaming, in turn, reinforces calls for
what Fraser has called a politics of recognition, a politics that advances
the edification and respect of different positioned groups.30 7 A politics
of recognition focuses on cultural solutions, which might include the
celebration of a subordination group's culture or heroes such as in black
history month, Martin Luther King Day, or advocate for participation in
gay parades? But a politics of recognition, while necessary, may not
address the structure of racial segmentation, stratification, and caste.
Assuming the legitimacy of the first question, a second question
nonetheless arises. It is: Why did so many black people stay behind or
find themselves stranded or left behind in New Orleans? Presumably,
these people did not stay behind because they were black but rather be-
cause they were poor. They lacked the means required to leave New
Orleans and to sustain themselves while away from their homes. 30 8 Why
they were so poor that they could not leave in the face of a serious hurri-
302. H.R.J. Res. 437, 109th Cong. (2005); Elizabeth Fussell, Understanding Katrina: Perspec-
tives from the Social Sciences (2005), http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Fussel/ (detailing argu-
ments highlighted here). For example, 27.3% of New Orleans households did not have cars, com-
pared to 9.4% of the U.S. population as a whole. See id. See generally MICHAEL ERIC DYSON,
COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER (2006).
303. DYSON, supra note 302, at 17-33 (explaining the ways in which race played a role in the
failure of the federal government to respond to the Katrina hurricane victims and noting that mali-
cious intent may not have been involved but indifference as part of a southern, national, and histori-
cal script where black grief and pain is involved are among the factors at work).
304. Id.
305. This may be the result of an understanding of racism as largely the product of intentional
individual action, a concept that ignores race as a caste system and a limited concept of race that is
promoted by colorblindness ideology. See Harris, supra note 42, at 750-52.
306. Delgado, Two Ways of Thinking about Race, supra note 17, at 2295.
307. FRASER, supra note 210, at 11-66.
308. DYSON, supra note 302, at 5-6 (discussing poverty in New Orleans and noting that one in
four people in New Orleans lacked access to a car).
[Vol. 84:2
CRITICAL RACE THEORY
cane when most others in the area were able to leave, in the richest coun-
try in the world, is the class question. Though this question may ulti-
mately implicate American sadism, it has much more to do with what
Rorty calls American selfishness. 30 9  That is, it is no doubt about eco-
nomics, but it is primarily about the policy choices and practices that
structure the production and maldistribution of resources that render
some groups well off and others much less So.
310
The third question was why the majority of the poor people in New
Orleans appeared to be overwhelmingly black when they constitute only
a little over a third of the metropolitan area of 1.3 million people.
31 1
These are the questions of class and race, the way class and race are re-
lated and have developed over time through structural elements, and
policies developed throughout the United States and in elements and
policies specific to Louisiana.312 Unraveling this question would pre-
sumably demonstrate the way in which racism is a co-constituent and
feature of the economic order in that it further delineates and allocates
certain economic functions and distributions to particular racialized and
classed groups. As such, race itself is a system for allocating resources
but one that is part and parcel of, or intertwined with the class system,
even as it operates independently and relatedly as a belief system that
provides a ready justification for the racialized results of various distribu-
tions, as well as providing cohesion to the overall system. Race provides
cohesion or stability, in part, by seducing the more privileged in the class
delineated by race (white working class v. black working class) to sup-
port the system in order to maintain both material and psychological
privileges.313 From this perspective, race arguably developed as part of
the U.S. economic system of slavery, to legitimate both it and other
forms of exclusion, and then was used, consciously and institutionally for
309. See generally RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1998).
310. See generally id.
311. See New Orleans Demographics, Population (LA), CityRating.com,
http://www.cityrating.com/citystats.asp?city=New+Orleans&state=LA (last visited Oct. 21, 2006)
(discussing the metropolitan area with a population of 1.3 million and a black people constituting
37.5% of the population); see also Dominguez, supra note 28 (discussing the term of "third world"
as applied to hurricane victims and discussing who was seen and unseen in this diverse metropolitan
area). Other questions might include whether it was only poor blacks stranded by Hurricane Katrina.
Though the majority of those stranded in New Orleans seemed to be black, were there others? Were
there poor whites also affected, and if so why were they less visible? And who might be served by
the invisibility of poor whites? For instance, as Dyson notes, some of the regions hardest-hit by
Katrina are suffer from extreme poverty. DYSON, supra note 302, at 5. The include Mississippi as
the poorest state in the nation and Louisiana the second poorest. Id Further, more than 90,000
people in these areas as well as parts of Alabama where Katrina hit made under $10,000 a year. Id.
312. DYSON, supra note 302, at 1-14 (discussing race and poverty and explaining that those left
behind in New Orleans had been socio-economically left behind years ago). That is, they suffered
from poverty and New Orleans in particular like many urban other urban areas in the US, suffered
from concentrated poverty. Id.
313. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 2, at 8 (citing EDMUND S. MORAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY,
AMERICAN FREEDOM 8 (1975)) (discussing how the development and maintenance of a poor black
subclass enabled and enables poor white to identify with wealthy whites).
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years to structure, perpetuate, and legitimate the resulting order of what
bell hooks calls the "white supremacist capitalist patriarchy. ' 3 14 That
racism can be addressed without addressing the economic class configu-
rations that structure race is doubtful. Similarly, the kind of mass-
movement needed to challenge dominant--economic-class315 power
would require dealing with the racial issues that divide those who must
work for their living as opposed to those, along with those with special-
ized skills, who live off the work of others.316
And finally, there is the question of the evacuation order, a policy
that seemed blind to the classed realities of poverty in New Orleans and
yet help to make visible the racialized maldistribution of resources in
New Orleans. Though the government was said to have had an evacua-
tion plan for New Orleans that recognized that over a hundred thousand
people might be stranded and included government efforts to locate and
move people out of the city who were unable to do so themselves, this
was not the evacuation plan carried out. Rather, the evacuation plan,
bungled no doubt, consisted primarily of an order for people to vacate
New Orleans, an order that which while recognizing that some people
might get stuck, assumed that most people had adequate and enough
wealth to evacuate. It was a policy and plan based on assumptions of
adequate wealth where for many no such wealth existed and in a country
where poverty levels and gaps between the rich and the poor, though
ignored, are increasing. That a policy of assumed wealth often disadvan-
tages a racialized population reflects the way that classed policies have
racial impact.
In a similar way, consider the famous case of San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez.317 Here the Supreme Court upheld
a school financing system that allowed one district's schools to be vastly
under funded as compared to another. 318 The under-funded school dis-
trict consisted mostly of Mexican Americans. 319 The Court's decision
did not rely on race but rather on wealth and assumptions of adequate
314. bell hooks, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 78 (1995).
315. See, e.g., Manning Marable, INTRODUCTION: BLACK STUDIES AND THE RACIAL
MOUNTAIN, in DISPATCHES FROM THE EBONY TOWER: INTELLECTUALS CONFRONT THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1, 19 (Manning Marable ed., 2000) (explaining a transformationist idea as
one seeks to "transform the existing power relationships and the racist institutions of the state, the
economy and society," and noting that this requires "the building of a powerful protest movement,
based largely among the most oppressed classes and social groups, to demand the fundamental
restructuring of the basic institutions and patterns of ownership within society[]").
316. Here I am relying on Jeff Faux description of the global elite class as comprising those
with specialized skills, those who control large corporations and those who live off their capital
earnings as opposed to living off of their work. See FAUX, supra note 287, at 64.
317. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
318. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 5-6.
319. Id. at 12.
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wealth. 320 The effect was that the racialized class of poor people would
continue to be so because they would attend inferior schools that would
render inferior jobs and thus maintain them as a relatively poor racialized
group. In this sense, race crits as lawyers should analyze class because
law makes decisions on the basis of wealth that have racial implications
and makes decisions on the basis of race that have wealth and class im-
plications.
These last three questions relating to race, class, and race- and class-
based policies and laws, may also better guide CRT's antisubordination
praxis. That is, it may counsel the kind of activities that are more effec-
tive in eliminating both racial and class subordination. These activities
may be those that do not simply call for the respect of subordinated
groups but seek to challenge, change, or transform the social arrange-
ments that structure the subordination itself. Fraser argues that the valua-
tion and respect of different groups is more likely in an egalitarian soci-
ety, a society where significant material inequalities between groups do
not exist.321 She contends that though a politics of recognition, which
call for respect of differently positioned groups is important, a "politics
of redistribution" that seeks to change the processes and conditions that
create and structure the devaluation of differently-positioned individuals
and groups is a more effective strategy for accomplishing the edification
of different groups in a pluralist society. 322 Rorty agrees, noting that
sadism may be more effectively undermined by policies and activities
that attack the selfish maldistribution of resources that create classes and
help to racialized groups. 3 23 The difference in strategy may be the dif-
ference between creating an outcry to force an incompetent and poten-
tially racist politician to resign his post after the hurricane or celebrating
the cultural mix needed to create a rich culture such as New Orleans, in
distinction to creating a movement to push for policies such as new and
affordable housing built on higher-ground, plans to locate, track and help
return poor evacuees back to the city, improved health care, adequate
living wages, greatly expanded public transportation system and/or in-
creased credit or other opportunities to buy cars, etc. Surely the first is
helpful, but the latter is indispensable.
CONCLUSION
I have suggested that critical race theory rose in response to, and as
a challenge to the ascendance of a colorblind ideology, an ideology that
seeks to ignore the structural, persistent and current manifestations of
320. 1 owe the insight of "assumed wealth" to Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman, editors of
Power, Privilege and Law. See POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 381-98 (discussing
Braveman's analysis of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez).
321. FRASER, supra note 210, at 27-33.
322. Id.
323. See generally RORTY, supra note 309.
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racism that inure from the social historical process of race formation in
the United States. The goal of colorblind ideology, while ostensively to
promote equality as symmetry among the races, in fact cements the privi-
leges of whiteness. CRT's insights about colorblindness, as well as a
number of its other themes and methodologies result in part from a proc-
ess of conflict inspired growth which provided CRT scholars the oppor-
tunity to experience the meaning and impact of their insights as part of
their development. These conflicts also however, in some ways spur the
development of CRT related scholarship. This scholarship while poten-
tially fragmenting the movement has in fact contributed much to the
theoretical project of CRT. This scholarship has expanded the CRT
knowledge base of different groups, historical experiences, it has ex-
panded CRT's knowledge around different kinds of oppression, and it
has aided CRT in the development of new theories. In doing so this
scholarship has also strengthened CRT's commitment to coalition build-
ing and antisubordination praxis.
Classcrits becomes another frontier for CRT. The expectation is
that classcrits will expand CRT knowledge about another type of subor-
dination and set of power relations that, like gender and sexuality, is dif-
ferently constructed than race, even as it mutually reinforces race. In
addition, classcrits becomes another way, in the face of the expansion of
colorblind ideology, to get, in part, at the materiality and economic foun-
dations of race. That is, while colorblind advocates continue to attempt
to reduce race to who did what, the question reappears in the form of
why the poor are disproportionately black or why blacks are dispropor-
tionately poor. And though a cultural reply that blames the victim is
expected, the tools will be developed to challenge these replies in ever
more sophisticated economic and class terms. And finally, though strate-
gies that attempt to overcome white cultural domination and promote
black and other non-white edification continue, these efforts will be com-
plemented by coalitions built across race and across types of oppression
to challenge the material, classed and economic structures and resource
allocations that shape them.
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